A TREATISE
Concerning the
INDIFFERENCIE
OF
HVMANE ACTIONS.

1 *Corinth.* 6. 10. All things are lawfull for me, but all things are not expedient. All things are lawfull for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any.

1 *Cor.* 10.23. All things are lawfull for me, but all things edifie not.

OXFORD,
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for *Tho: Robinson*, 1659.

To the Right VVorſhipfull Sir *WILLIAM WYNDHAM*, of Orchard Wyndham, in the County of *Somerſet*, *BARONET*.

SIR,

THoſe that know the depth of my obligations to you, have long ſince expected my publique acknowledgment thereof; and having now an opportunity to make it: My own Conſcience would condemne me of a moſt diſingenuous ingratitude, if I ſhould any longer deferre it. But not only my private, and perſonall engagements, but your own merit will juſtify this Dedication: for 'tis ſo well, and generally known, as that it may, with a great deale of juſtice, entitle you unto the exacteſt peices of the able pens of the age, therefore much more unto the poore, and meane endeavours of

Your Unworthy, though moſt gratefull Servant HENRY JEANES.

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Have often wondred at ſome Prelatiſts, charging the poore non-conformiſts with deny-all of things indifferent; from which their Writings do ſufficiently acquit them: Dr *Iohn Burgeſs* (*in his Rejoinder, Pag.* 188, 189.) tells us, that Mr *Bradſhaw* againſt all Learning, and ſenſe, reſolves, that there is nothing indifferent. But from this accuſation, we have Dr *Ames* his Vindication (*in his freſh ſuite againſt Ceremonies, pag.* 161, 162.) Dr *Hammond* (*in his grounds of Uniformity*) accuſeth *Ameſius* himſelfe for this opinion; but with how little truth, the Reader may ſoone ſee, if he pleaſe to peruſe theſe following places in him, *Med. Theolog. lib.* 2. *cap.* 3 *ſect.* 13, 14, 15. *De Conſcientiâ &c. lib.* 3. *cap.* 18. *Gregory de Valentia* informes me, that one of the Articles of *Iohn Huſſe*, (anathematized in the Councill of Conſtance) was, that *nulla ſunt opera indifferentia.* That which Papiſts of old charged upon him, theſe men impute to thoſe, whom they have been pleaſed to nickname Puritan's. But

for the untruth, and injuſtice of this crimination, we dare appeale to the more moderate, and Learned of their own party. The Reverend, and Learned Dr *Sanderſon* diſputeth againſt them, for making the reſtraint of the outward man in matters indifferent, an impeachment to Chriſtian liberty; on *Rom*: 14. 3. *Pag.* 24.25. And this preſuppoſeth that they held ſomethings to be in their nature indifferent. I ſhall therefore ſpend no more time, or paper, to wipe off an aſperſion ſo manifeſtly untrue, and unjuſt: But yet however this hath occaſioned me to reſolve upon the brieſe ſtating of the truth touching things, or actions indifferent: and in order hereunto I ſhall 1. Premiſe ſome *Diſtinctions* concerning the actions of man; and 2. *Explaine* what is meant by indifferency.

1. *Firſt*, The actions of man are either *indeliberate* or *deliberate*.

1. *Indeliberate*, which proceed, either from the *diſpoſition of naturall qualities* (as hungering, thirſting, the eaſing and disburdening of nature) or elſe from the *force of Imagination*, (as rubbing of the beard, or hand, ſcratching of the head, lifting up of a ſtraw from the ground, and ſuch like things, when a man thinks not of them.)

2. *Deliberate*, which proceed from deliberate reaſon and are properly humane, and rationall actions, all voluntary actions.

Theſe may be conſidered two manner of waies. 1. *In the generall, actu ſignato.* 2. *In the ſingulars, and individual's, actu exercito.*

The *former* conſideration is meerly in regard of the object; The *latter* taketh in all circumſtances whatſoever: The *former* is a conſideration of actions, *ſecundum ſpeciem*, according to their *ſort or kind*; The *latter* is a conſideration of them in regard of their *actuall exiſtence*.

In a *ſecond* place we are to enquire, what is meant by the indifferency of actions: It apparently carrieth in its notion, a *negation of morall goodneſſe, and illneſſe*: I ſay, *ſignanter*, of morall goodneſſe, and illneſſe; becauſe the moſt indifferent actions are *tranſcendently*, and may be *naturally* good. *An indifferent action then is that, which is neither morally good, nor evill*: The nature of things indifferent, (*ſaith the great Hooker in his Eccleſiaſt. Policie,*

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*Pag.*59.) is *neither to be commanded, nor forbidden, but left free, and arbitrary:* With which I would desire Dr *Hammond* to reconcile what he hath in his Treatise of Will-worship, *that the best of morall actions, the highest degrees of vertue, and of worship, the most superlative love of God are uncommanded*: and he, I hope, will give me leave to adde, that they are not forbidden, and hereupon I shall conclude, that (by Mr *Hooker* his definition) they are indifferent; which is as unsober a conceit allmost, as can be uttered, and unworthy of any serious refutation. I shall here onely make use of part of his expressions against *Ames (in his grounds of Uniformity, Pag.*14.) He that thinks the highest degree of vertue is indifferent, doth certainly use *other* Dictionaries then we doe. But to leave him, I shall for clearing the nature of indifferency propound, and satisfie *two Queries.*

1. What *medium* indifferent things are betwixt things *morally good*, and *evill?* whether *medium abnegationis*, or *participationis?* The *Author* of *Altare Damascenum* affirmeth it to be medium *or a middle betwen* them by way of *abnegation*, *Adiaphora non sunt media per participationem, ut rubedo inter album, & nigrum; sed per negationem utriúsque extremi, conformitatis & difformitatis ad rectam rationem, seu legem*, pag.496.

But for the disproofe of this, I shall desire you to obserue out of (*a*) *Capreolus*, that a thing may be said to be a medium, or middle betwixt that which is morally good, and morally evill; either by

(*a*) Esse indifferens ad bonum, & malum contingit dupliciter,

aut per *modum* abstractionis, secundum quod universale aliquid significat ut abstractum à differentiis, & concontrariis dividentibus ipsum, unde in suâ communitate significatum significatur ut indifferenter se habens ad utramque differentiam. Sicut animal réque significatur ut rationale nèque ut irrationale, & tamen oportet omne particulare animal esse rationale vel irrationale. Et similiter est hoc. Si enim significetur actus in eo quod est agere, habet quidem bonitatem in quantum est ens, sed indifferenter se habet ad bonitatem, vel malitiam moralem. Et similiter bonum ex genere indifferenter se habet ad bonum & malum ex circumstantiâ & fine, quamvis non inveniatur aliquod bonum in genere particulari, quod non sit aliquâ circumstantiâ vestitum, & ad aliquem finem ordinatum, unde oportet, quod bonitatem, vel malitiam contrahat. Et secundum hanc considerationem quidam dixerunt omnes actus indifferentes esse in eo quod sunt actus, & quidam dixerunt, quod non omnes, sed aliqui, accipientes magis in speciali nomina actuum, quæ non exprimunt aliquid, unde actus, ad malitiam vel bonitatem determinetur, vel materiam vel finem vel circumstantiam, sicut comedere, coire, et hujusmodi. Alio modo contingit hoc secundum, quod aliquod particulare significatum deficit a susceptibilitate alicujus perfectionis, sicut lapis à susceptibilitate visus, & hoc modo aliqui actus, qui dicuntur a susceptibilitate bonitatis moralis dicuntur indifferenter. lib. 2. senten. dist. 40. quæst. 1.

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way *of abſtraction* from them (as a generall nature is abſtracted from it's differences, a ſubject from it's accidents;) or elſe by way of *repugnancy* unto them, becauſe it is uncapable of them; and thus a ſtone is of a middle nature betwixt that which ſeeth, and is blind; becauſe it is uncapable of both ſight, and blindneſſe. Now it is this latter way, that a thing is ſaid to be a medium by the abnegation of each extreame; as is evident by the inſtances uſually brought for the exemplification hereof; For they are of ſuch things as are uncapable of, and repugnant unto both extreames. And the moſt indifferent actions, that proceed from deliberate reaſon, are capable of becoming either good, or evill, by circumſtances, and carry no repugnancy thereunto: ſo much is confeſſed by *Didoclave* himſelfe in the place above mentioned. *Tertium quod conſtituit hujus medii formale eſt non repugnantia ad utrunque extremum. Actus homicidii in bove cornu-peta nullam habet conformitatem, aut difformitatem ad rectam rationem, non tamen dicitur actus indifferens, quia ibi eſt repugnantia ad utrunque extremum, nam bos eſt animal irrationale. Adiaphora igitur ſunt dubia, indiſtincta, &* UTRÓQUE *vergentia, ſed non magis vergentia in unum quam alterum extremum.*

Others therefore conclude, that indifferent actions are a medium, or middle betwixt good, and bad, in a way of *participation*; and that either *potentiall*, or *actuall*.

1. *Potentiall*, There is in them a non-repugnancy unto either of the extreames, unto morall goodneſſe or badneſſe, ſo that they may be either good, or bad by circumſtances.

2. *Actuall*, and this agreeth onely to ſuch indifferent acts, as become good by circumſtances; for they being but imperfectly good, are in part good, and in part evill, and ſo partake actually of both extreames. By this you may ſee, though indifferent actions, which proceed from deliberate reaſon may in ſome ſenſe be ſaid to be a medium of participation betwixt that which is morally good, or evill; yet they are not ſaid to be a middle of participation in ſuch a *ſtrict ſenſe*, as lukewarmneſſe is betwixt cold, and heat; for that alwaies partaketh actually of both extreames (cold, and heat,) whereas indifferent actions doe not alwaies actually partake of the two extreames, (morall goodneſſe or badneſſe,) but onely when they are good; for many of them may be, and

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too often are by circumstances *totally* and altogether evill, and in *no respect* good. *Amesius* qualifies the matter, and affirmeth that as it is not *medium meræ abnegationis*, so it is medium *alicujus participationis*, a middle not of meere abnegation, but of some participation. Absolutely, and simply, in strictnesse of speech, it is neither *medium negationis*, nor *participationis:* 1. Not *negationis*; because it hath no repugnancy unto it's extreames: 2. Not *participationis*, because it doth not *allwaies actually* partake of both extreames; But yet, *secundum quid*, after a sort, and in some respect, it may be reduced unto both *medium abnegationis*, and *participationis*: It resembleth *medium abnegationis*, because *as such* it is neither of the extreames; and it resembleth *medium participationis*, because sometimes it *actually* participates of both extreames: And thus you see how these different opinions may be reconciled; But yet (because *denominatio fit â potiori*) we shall rather reduce it unto *medium participationis*, because unto that it hath the greatest resemblance.

A second question is; Whether all indifferent actions be equally indifferent? no more bending unto evill, then unto good? *Didoclave* holds the affirmative, *Nec solum* (saith he) *requiritur negatio conformitatis, seu difformitatis ad legem ceu rectam rationem, sed etiam majoris propensionis in unam quam in aliam partem.* And againe afterwards: *Adiaphora non sunt magis vergentia in unum quam alterum extremum.* The incomparably Learned Dr *Sanderson* is of a contrary opinion, that some things are *unequally* indifferent, *Indifferentia ad unum* (as he is pleased to call them) I shall transcribe his words, and with all due reverence of his person briefely examine them.

Dr *Sanderson* on *Rom*: 3. 8. *pag.* 58. 59.

Things unequally indifferent are such, as though they be neither universally good, not absolutely evill, yet even barely considered, sway more, or lesse rather the one way, then the other: And that either unto good, or unto evill. Of the former sort are such outward actions, as being in morall precepts indefinitely commanded, are yet sometimes sinfully and ill done: as, giving an almes, hearing a sermon, reproving an offender; and the like, which are in themselves good, and so to be accounted, rather then evill; though some unhappy Circumstance or other may make them ill. Of the latter sort are such outward

actions, as being in morall precepts indefinitely prohibited, are yet in ſome caſes lawfull, and may be well done: as, ſwearing an oath, travelling on the Sabbath day, playing for money, and the like: which are in themſelves rather evill, then good, becauſe they are ever evill, unleſſe all circumſtances concurre to make them good. Now of theſe actions, though the former ſort carry the face of good, the latter of evill; yet in very truth both ſorts are indifferent. Underſtand me aright: I do not meane indifferent, indifferentiâ contradictionis, *ſuch as may be indifferently either done, or not done; but indifferent onely* indifferentiâ contrarietatis, *ſuch as (ſuppoſe the doing) may be indifferently either good, or evill: becauſe ſo they may be done, as to be good, and ſo they may be done alſo, as to be evill; but yet with this difference, that thoſe former, though indifferent, and in ſome caſes evill, are yet of themſelves notably and eminently inclined unto good rather then evill; and theſe latter proportionably unto evill, rather then good.*

For *anſwere:* The firſt ſort of actions, ſuch as being in morall precepts indefinitely commanded, are yet ſometimes ſinfully and ill done, (as, giving an almes, hearing a ſermon, reproving an offender, and the like,) are not in the language of the Schoolmen, indifferent actions: This I ſhall make good by an argument out of *Suarez* (brought by him unto another purpoſe;) He diſputing againſt ſome, that held all humane actions to be indifferent, proves the contrary; Firſt in *inward*, then in *outward actions*: and his argument concerning outward actions ſtands thus. If externall acts be conſidered according to an objective goodneſſe, or illneſſe, this cannot be true, becauſe there are many actions in their own nature objectively evill, and prohibited, and there are other alſo objectively good, and honeſt; becauſe this goodneſſe, and illneſſe is not taken by extrinſick Denomination, from the inward act, but from it's intrinſecall agreement with, or repugnancy unto right reaſon. Thoſe actions which have a *materiall, and objective* goodneſſe, are not indifferent actions in the language of the Schooles. But the actions, that the Doctor ſpeaks of, have an objective, and materiall goodneſſe, becauſe they are commanded, and therefore they are not indifferent. But, ſaith the Doctor, they are indifferent at leaſt *indifferentiâ Contrarietatis*, "ſuch as (ſuppoſe the doing) may be indifferently either good or evill: becauſe "ſo they may be done, as to be good, and ſo thy emay be done alſo, "as to be evill.

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For *answer:* By this account all outward ordinances of God, all externall acts of worship, and indeed all outward good works whatsoever should be actions indifferent, because they may be done well, or ill: But to say that all these are indifferent would be very strange language: for although they may have evill cast upon them externally by the agent, yet this is no hinderance but that they may be in themselves *objectively* and *materially good*, as being matter of precept.

But perhaps there may be some mystery in this clause, *indefinitely commanded*: They are commanded, but not to be performed alwaies, but only *loco, & tempore debitis*; according to the known rule, *Affirmativa præcepta obligant semper, non ad semper.*

For *answer:* This will nothing alter the case; for hereby it will follow, that the matter of all affirmative precepts should be indifferent; And whosoever shall say so takes indifferency in a different notion from the usuall acception thereof by both Papists, and Protestants; who jointly make it to be a middle thing betwixt that morall goodnesse, and badnesse, which is called *objective* or *materiall.*

As for the *second sort* of Actions, I readily confesse that in some sense they may be said to be unequally indifferent, inclining and swaying more to evill, then to good. To cleare which I shall distinguish of a *twofold consideration* of such actions: They may be considered *meerly in regard of their object*, or else also in regard of the *circumstances, which usually are annexed with them:* In regard of their *object* they are equally indifferent; But yet in regard of *Circumstances* may be said to be more notably and eminently inclined unto evill then unto good; because the circumstances, which generally, and commonly are connexed with them, are evill.

But as for the reason, which the Doctor bringeth to prove them to be unequally indifferent, rather evill, then good, is to me very unsatisfying. His words are, *which are in themselves rather evill, then good, because they are ever evill, unlesse all circumstances concurre to make them good.*

The ground of my exception against this reason is; because as much may be said of all outward good works, religious duties, and

ſervices whatſoever: They are all ever evill, unleſſe all circumſtances concurre to make them good, according to that of *Dionyſius, Bonum fit ex cauſâ integrâ: malum ex quovis defectu.* I ſhall conclude my anſwer unto this ſecond *Quere*, with rehearſall of Dr *Ames* his propoſall, and deciſion of it. *An actiones indifferentes nihil inter ſe differant, ſed æquè omnes à bono, & malo diſtent?*

Reſp. In ſuâ intrinſecâ naturâ nihil omnino differunt, ſed tamen quædam ſunt, quæ ut plurimum habent circumſtantias malas annexas, atque adeò dicuntur vergere in malum, aut in malum ſonare, ut accuſatoris aut carnificis munere fungi: quædam etiam, quæ ut plurimum habent circumſtantias bonas annexas, atque adeò dicuntur vergere in bonum, aut in bonum ſonare, ut colere agros, diligentiam in ſtudiis adhibere, &c.

In their own intrinſecall nature they differ nothing at all: but yet there are ſome which for the moſt part have evill circumſtances annexed to them, and ſo bend more toward evill, and have an evill name: as to do the worke of an accuſer, the office of an hangman, &c. ſome there be alſo which for the moſt part have good circumſtances, and ſo bend toward good, and have a good name, as to till the ground, to follow our ſtudy diligently &c.

Having premiſed theſe things, I ſhall in the next place, proceed to lay downe ſome concluſions concerning the indifferency of the actions of man. and they ſhall be three.

1. *Concluſion.* The Indeliberate actions of man which proceed from the diſpoſition of naturall qualities, or onely from the Imagination, as to rub the beard, or hands, to ſcratch the head, to move the head, feet, or a ſtaffe (The mind being not intent upon them,) may be, and are indifferent, *not onely in the generall, but in their individuals*, and *ſingulars:* The reaſon which (*b*) *Aquinas* giveth for this is very ſolid; Becauſe ſuch actions to ſpeake properly are not morall, and humane, for they do not proceed from the ſoule as reaſonable: Thoſe actions, which are not morall, or of morall conſideration, are uncapable of morall goodneſſe or badneſſe: for morall goodneſſe, or badneſſe implieth a morall beeing: But now thoſe actions which proceed from the diſpoſition of naturall qualities, or from the force of the Imagination onely are not

(*b*) 1.2æ qu. 18. art. 9.

not morall, are not of morall conſideration, they are *extra genus moris*: And the reaſon is becauſe actions have their morality from this, that they are ſome way or other immediately, or mediately derived from reaſon.

Againſt this reaſon of Aquinas, (*c*) *Durand* propounds this following objection: that if the acts of the imagination be uncapable of a morall being, and ſo not of a morall conſideration, that then they are uncapable of ſinne: for every ſinfull action is a morall action: But now they are not uncapable of ſinne: for it is moſt evident, that *in ſenſualitate poteſt eſſe peccatum*, that ſin may be in the indeliberate acts of the ſenſitive appetite, and in the acts of the imagination; and the reaſon is, becauſe the ſenſuall powers or faculties are ſaid to belong or appertaine unto reaſon, though not *eſſentialiter*, yet *participativè*, as being under the conduct and guidance of right reaſon, obliged to hearken unto it's voyce, and to obey all it's juſt Commands, and dictates.

Sed contra hoc inſtatur, quia ubi invenitur dominium rationis, vel voluntatis, ibi invenitur genus moris, ſed dominium rationis vel voluntatis invenitur non ſolum in actibus qui ſequuntur rationem deliberantem, ſed etiam qui præcedunt, in quantum à ratione præveniri potuerunt, ut dictum fuit, ſupra, diſt. 24. q. 5. (alioquin in ſenſualitate nullum poſſet eſſe peccatum) ergo actus procedentes à ſolâ imaginatione

The *anſwere* here-unto in the ſame Author is, that the *indeliberate* acts of the ſenſitive powers, and faculties are of two ſorts.

1. Some have for their *matter*, *ſinne*, and ſuch are morall: for they are voluntary, though not *directly*, as being produced or commanded by the will, yet *indirectly*, as being that, which the will is able, and obliged to hinder: and therefore reaſon ought to be watchfull to prevent the riſing of them.

But now there are ſome indeliberate acts of the ſenſitive faculties, which have not for their obiects the *matter of ſinne*, ſuch as are above inſtanced in, and of them we may ſay indefinitely, and in the *generall*, that they are not morall; becauſe they are not voluntary, either *directly*, *or indirectly*; Reaſon is not bound to

pertinent ad genus moris, quia ſubſunt imperio rationis, in quantum ab ea poſſunt prævenîri, et ſic per conſequens ſunt ſuſceptivi bonitatis, & malitiæ moralis, cujus oppoſitum aſſumebatur pro fundamento.

Et ad hoc poteſt dici, quod aliqui actus procedentes ab imaginatione, et prævenientes deliberationem rationis ſunt tales, circa quos ratio debet eſſe pervigil, ne inſurgant, et tales ſunt actus appetitus ſenſitivi circa materiam peccati &c. & reſpectu talium actuum quantumcunque deliberationem prævenant, poteſt eſſe negligens ratio in reprimendo, & peccare &c. Et de his procedit ratio, ſcilicet quod ſunt aliquo modo in genere moris, nec ſunt indifferentes. Alii autem ſunt, circa quos ratio nullo modo tenetur eſſe pervigil, niſi in caſu ratione alicujus adjuncti, quia objecta talium ſecundum ſe non ſunt materia alicujus peccati &c. ut levare feſtucam, vel fricare barbam: Et tales actus ut ſic pervenientes, quos non tenetur prævenire ratio, niſi in caſu ſunt purè extra genus moris, & indifferentes ad bonum, & malum, de quibus intelligenda eſt prædicta opinio.

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keepe any watch over them, nor is the will bound to reſtraine, and repreſſe them; *niſi in caſu, ratione alicujus adiuncti*, as *Durand* limits it. As when they are a hinderance to Duties, or againſt that decency which is required in the worſhip, and ſervice of God; As for example if a man ſhould be rubbing of his beard, ſcratching of his head, moving of his feete, or any other part of his body in an undecent way in the act of receiving the elements in the Lords ſupper: That which I have ſaid touching this Concluſion is for the ſubſtance of it in *Ames de Conſcientiâ. lib.* 3. *cap.* 18. His words I ſhall tranſcribe. *Actiones quædam ita ſunt hominis, ut non ſint proprie humanæ, illæ ſcilicet, quæ procedunt ab imaginatione nudâ, & non a ratione deliberatâ, ut fricare manus, aut barbam, ſcalpere caput, levare feſtucam, &c. dum aliud aliquid cogitamus. Hujuſmodi actiones non ſunt moraliter bonæ aut malæ: quia non ſunt in genere moris conſtitutæ, dum omni conſilio deſtituuntur. Quamvis enim iſtis etiam poſſit quis peccare, ut ſi tempore precum vagari ſineret imaginationem ſuam, et huiuſmodi nugis indulgere, ipſæ tamen actiones per ſe neque malæ ſunt, neque bonæ. Subijciuntur quidem iſtiuſmodi motus imperio arbitrii humani; ſed ita ſubijciuntur, ut poſſint exerceri nullo rationis actu præeunte: neque vlterius illas ratione prævenire tenemur, quam ut officijs non obſint. Sicut in oculorum palpebris movendis moderandi poteſtatem habet ratio, et voluntas: ſed non eſt operæ pretium obſervare quoties connivemus; ſi modo caveatur, ne præter decorum, aut officium aliquid in iſtis admittatur.*

1. There be ſome actions, which though they be actions of man, yet they are not humane actions, ſuch are thoſe which proceed from imagination only, and not from deliberate reaſon, as the rubbings of mens hands, to ſcratch the head or beard, to take up a ſtraw, &c. while we are thinking of ſomething elſe: theſe actions are not morally good or evill, they want that which is required to make them ſo, namely counſell and deliberation: for although a man may ſin by thoſe actions, as if in time of prayer he ſuffer his imagination to wander, and do give way to ſuch toyings as thoſe. Yet theſe actions conſidered in themſelves are neither good nor evill. It is true theſe motions are ſubject to the Command of mans will, but yet they are ſo ſubject, that they may be exerciſed without any precedent act of reaſon; neither are we bound

bound any farther by reaſon to prevent them, but only ſo far that they hinder not the duties we are about. So for moving of the eye-lids, reaſon and the will have power to moderate them, but it is not worth the while to take notice how often we winke, if ſo be we take heed, that in ſuch things nothing be done, which is undecent, or againſt our duty.

A *ſecond Concluſion:* There be divers deliberate actions, that proceed from deliberate reaſon, which if they be conſidered *in actu ſignato*, in the generall, *ſecundum ſpeciem*, according to their ſort, or Kind, as abſtracted from all ſingularizing circumſtances. are indifferent, neither morally good, nor evill: This I ſhall confirme by ſcripture, and by reaſon.

1. *By ſcripture:* And here we have a moſt ſignall place. 1. *Cor.* 6. 12. *All things are lawfull unto me.* Here all things are to be taken not *abſolutely*, but *limitedly*, for all indifferent things: for as for things Commanded, they are not onely lawfull, but alſo neceſſary, and therefore muſt be done *loco & tempore debitis*: And as for things prohibited, they are unlawfull and ſinfull. The words then are an undeniable proofe of the indifferency of ſome actions, and withall an explication of ſuch indifferency: Indifferent actions are meerly lawfull, neither neceſſary, nor unlawfull; They may lawfully be done, and lawfully be abſtained from. In this text then we have the *extent* of our Chriſtian liberty *aſſerted*, and *limited*.

1. We have the extent of it unto all indifferent things *aſſerted*; And the Apoſtle contents not himſelfe to affirme it once, but doubleth the affirmation: The reaſon of which may be, becauſe he thought it an important point, or becauſe he would put it out of all doubt, and controverſy.

2. We have alſo a *twofold limitation*, or reſtraint put upon the uſe or exerciſing of our Chriſtian liberty as touching things indifferent; *But all things are not expedient*; *But I will not be brought under the power of any.*

Many think, that *Paul* ſpeaks theſe words *per mimeſin*, a figure called imitation; that he ſpeakes not in his own perſon, but rehearſeth the words of the Corinthians: ſo that here is, firſt *Corinthiorum* ἀποδοσὶς, the objection of the Corinthians, *All things are lawfull for me*: ſecondly, *Apoſtoli* ἀνθυποδοσὶς, the reply of *Paul*, *But*

But all things are not expedient: *But I will not be brought under the power of any*. But whether the Apoſtle uttered his own words, or the Corinthians is not materiall: becauſe, ſuppoſe they be the words of the Corinthians, he grants them with due limitations: The ſentence of *Paul*, ſaith *Ægidius Hunnius*, conſiſt's of a *conceſſion*, and *correction*.

1. *A Conceſſion* of the lawfulneſſe of all indifferent things. *All things are lawfull for me.*

2. *A Correction* or reſtriction of this large grant: wherein he ſheweth: that though all indifferent things be in their generall nature lawfull, yet they are in ſome caſes to be abſtained from, when they are *inexpedient*: when they *enthrall* us unto either *perſons, or things*: *But all things are not expedient*: *But I will not be brought under the power of any*.

A great difference there is amongſt expoſitors about the coherence of theſe words: Some thinke, that the Apoſtle makes way for that Argument which he handles at large *chap*: 9. All things are lawfull for me; therefore to receive a ſalary for preaching of the Goſpell is lawfull: But I will not make uſe of this my liberty: Becauſe it will not be expedient unto the promoting of the Goſpell amongſt you, but an hinderance rather: And becauſe I will retaine my full liberty of reproving you, which I ſhall in great part loſe, if I ſhould receive my whole livelyhood from you: As it fares with the falſe prophets among you, that are no better then Trencher chaplaines, that dare not touch your ſores, medle with either your ſinnes, or errours, for feare that hereupon you ſhould ſhorten your benevolence: *I will not be brought under the power of any*. But the coherence is too farre fetcht, and we may ſay the ſame of others, who would make theſe words to cohere with *chap*. 8. *v*. 9.

Others with more probability derive the connexion of the words onely from the preſent chapter: and they are again ſubdivided: ſome fetch it from the words *foregoing*: Others from the words *following*.

1. *From the words foregoing*. The Apoſtles diſcourſe about going to law with Brethren before the unjuſt, and unbelievers: The Corinthians might be ready to object in behalfe of this their practiſe, that it was a thing in it's own nature indifferent, not prohibited

prohibited by the word of God, and therefore lawfull; for all things are lawfull, that is all indifferent things. True, ſaith the Apoſtle, but. 1. all things are not expedient: And in particular for Chriſtians to ſue Chriſtians before Paganiſh Tribunals is ſo far from being expedient, as that it is an impediment *unto Chriſtians* own glorifying of God in his immediate worſhip and ſervice, as alſo unto their quiet, peaceable, and comfortable communion with Brethren.

2. *I will not be brought under the power of any*, either perſons, or things. And if you goe in this manner to law with your Brethren you will put your ſelves under the power of many both *perſons*, and *things*.

1. *Perſons*: Perhaps you will lie at the mercy of an unjuſt judg: a falſe witneſſe may undoe you; A corrupt lawyer betray you; your own witneſſes will command your table, and purſe, though for atteſting the truth; And though your Advocates be never ſo faithfull, you muſt give them your moſt diligent attendance; As the *proverb* is, you muſt not only pay, *but pray them too.*

2. *Things*: The many matters, the things of the world, which you ſue for, will have you ſo farre under their power, as that they will be a great hinderance to your free, and full ſervice of God; for if they doe not wholly withdraw you from it, they will wonderfully diſtract you in it; Becauſe law ſuits will take up the greateſt part of your time, and the beſt of your thoughts. (*d*)

Adde unto this, that for Chriſtians, eſpecially in thoſe primitive times, to purſue their Brethren unto the judgment-ſeats of heathens, in matters capable of an amicable compromiſe by the mediation of Brethren, was a plaine evidence, that they were under the *power* of the world, and the things thereof; for who but a muck-worme, a vaſſall to his wealth, would doe a thing ſo much unto the diſcredit of the Goſpell, and reproach of Chriſtianity; eſpecially ſeeing they might with greater probability expect juſtice from the umpirage of ſaints, then the ſentences of profeſſed unbelievers?

(*d*) Quidem hanc partem ſic explicant: Sub nullius redigar poteſtate, i. e. Non patiar me propter res pecuniarias, ac temporales, ve. lut eſſem ſub earum poteſtate, vel abſtrahi vel diſtrahi, quo minùs liberè, & abſque impedimento ſerviam Deo, quod non potero, ſi tempus & cogitationes impendam litibus. Eſthius in loc.

Others in the next place look for the cohæſion of theſe words forwards, upon the Apoſtles enſuing diſcourſ, touching fornication: not only the Corinthians, but the Gentiles in generall held ſimple fornicatiõ to be a thing indifferent. The old man in the *Comedian*, ſpake the ſenſe of the generality of them: *Crede mihi non eſt flagitium adoleſcentulum ſcortari.* And you will the leſs wonder at this, if you cõſider, that *Durand*, a Popiſh Schoolman, held it to be unlawfull, not by the law of nature, but only by the poſitive law of God: *Quod autem dicunt quidam, quod ſimplex fornicatio eſt peccatum mortale de ſe, excluſâ omni lege poſitivâ, divinâ & humanâ, non benè intelligo, lib. 4. diſt. 33. quæſt. 2.* And upon the Conſideration of this opinion of the Gentiles touching the indifferency of fornication it was, (think interpreters,) that fornication is Acts. 15. by the firſt Council ranged amongſt indifferent things, bloud, and things ſtrangled; The uſe of which was forbidden onely for a time. Unto this erroneous ſuppoſition the Apoſtle anſwereth *per limitationem, & per inficiationem:* He *limits* the generall rule touching things indifferent, and then he *denieth* the inſtance in queſtion; And this his denyall he *illuſtrateth*, and *confirmeth* from *verſ.* 13. *unto the end of the chapter.* Unto this his deniall he premiſeth limitations of the generall rule. *All indifferent things are lawfull:* He puts a double reſtraint upon it. *The firſt: But all things are not expedient, or profitable:* Many indifferent things ſometimes prove an impediment unto our Chriſtian race, and then they are to be forborne. *A ſecond* reſtraint is in theſe words: *But I will not be brought under the power of any:* My affection unto indifferent things ſhall be ſo temperate, as that it ſhall be in my power to forbeare them upon reaſonable and important Conſiderations. There ſhould be an indifferencie in our deſires towards things indifferent, ſo that they ſhould not have the command of us; but we ſhould be able to uſe, or not to uſe them, as the concurrence of particular circumſtances guide us.

To give yet further light unto theſe words, I ſhall briefly conſider their coherence as they lie in 1 *Cor.* 10.23. with little variation. The Apoſtle there ſtates a caſe of Conſcience touching the eating of Idolothytes, things offered unto Idoles. *Firſt*, he reſolves, that to eat them publiquely in the temple of Idoles, at the idolatrous feaſts of theſe Idoles, was to have communion in the worſhip

worſhip of theſe idols to have fellowſhip with Divels; to be partakers of the table of Divels: He that did thus eat them, did eat them conſidered *formally*, as ſacrificed and conſecrated to idoles; He did eat them in the honour of the idols, unto which they were offered; He did *tacitly* acknowledg their Deity, and *interpretatively* approve of the Idolatrous worſhip and ſervice of them; But now the Apoſtle alloweth a private uſe of things offered to idols, If they were not eaten under a religious notion, but conſidered onely and *materially* as meat, matter of food, and as the good creatures of God. *Two caſes* he inſtanceth in, wherein they might be thus eaten; *Firſt*, they might buy them in the ſhambles, and eat them in their own houſes, *verſ.* 25. And *ſecondly*, they might eat them at the tables of their unbelieving neighbours, that invited them: This latter part of the Determination of the queſtion he confirmes, and limiteth, by putting in an exception in the caſe of ſcandall: And unto all this he prefixeth the extenſion of our Chriſtian liberty, unto all indifferent things in the generall, together with two reſtrictions, that we are to put upon it in *the uſe* and exerciſe: Even indifferent things are to be forborne, *when* they are not profitable, and conducing unto the ends, which a Chriſtian ſhould propound: *when* they are deſtructive and ſcandalous unto our Brethren: (*) *All things are lawfull for me, but all things are not expedient: All things are lawfull for me, but all things edifie not.*

(*) Omniamihi licent, omnia ſcilicet adiaphora, quale eſt comedere idolothyta, non quaſi ſacra, aut quaſi idolothyta ſed tanquam communes cibos. Ubi nota, Hactenus egit Paulus de idolothytis, qua talibus, ſicque vetuit ea comedere. Unde v. 14. Fugite, ait, ab idolorum cultu, ſcilicet, ne ſitis menſæ, & calicis dæmoniorum participes, ut explicat v. 20. puta, comedendo cibos idolis obla-

Unto theſe two places (1 *Cor.* 6. 12. 1 *Cor.* 10. 23.) I ſhall adde one more (1 *Cor.* 8. 8.) *But meat Commendeth us not to God*: for *neither, if we eat are we the better*: neither *if we eat not, are we the worſe*: Meat (that is) the uſe and eating of meat (*abſtractly* conſidered, *and in the generall*) commendeth us not to God: for the kingdome of God is not meat and drink: for *neither if we eat, are we the better, παρισάνομεν*, have we the more, (that is) the more vertue in our ſelves, the more grace and favour with God: *Neither if we eat not,*

tos, eo modo & iis circumſtantiis, quibus cenſeamini eos, quaſi ſacros, ſeu quaſi idolothytum in honorem idoli velle comedere: hoc vero verſu tranſit ad iecundum caſum, ſcilicet, quo idolothytum non formaliter qua idolothytum, ſed materialiter, qua cibus vel caro eſt, comeditur, & de hoc ait: omnia mihi licent, ſed non omnia expediunt, quia, ut ſequitur, non omnia ædificant. Quaſi dicat, Materialiter licet veſci idolothyto per ſe, per accidens tamen non licet, ſi ſequatur ſcandalum, patet ex v. 27. 28. 33. Cornel. Alapide in loc.

are *we the worſe* ὑστερούμεθα, have *we the* leſſe, the leſſe vertue in our ſelves, the leſſe acceptation with God: Eating then of any ſort or kind of meat (*conſidered, as abſtracted from all ſingularizing circumſtances*) is a thing indifferent that hath neither vertue, nor vice in it, neither pleaſeth nor diſpleaſeth God: And what the Apoſtle ſpeaketh of eating of meat, is applyable by way of *analogy and proportion* unto a world of things of the like nature, as ſhall be manifeſted by the reaſons for the Concluſion, unto which in the next place I haſten.

The *Proteſtants* generally thus argue: The nature of things indifferent (as the *Learned Hooker* determineth) is neither to be commanded nor forbidden, but left free and arbitrary: But now there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are in the generall neither commanded, nor forbidden (as to eat, drink, goe a journey, walke into the field:) Therefore there are diverſe humane and voluntary actions, that are in the generall, and for the kind indifferent. This argument the Papiſts diſlike becauſe they think, that there are *matters of Counſell*, which containe the higheſt degree of morall goodneſſe, and perfection: And yet thinke they are uncommanded, and no man will ſay that they are forbidden. The Argument of the Schoolmen therefore generally runs thus: Actions, that are neither agreeable, nor diſagreeable unto right reaſon are indifferent: But there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that in their generall nature, and conſideration carry, neither conformity, nor repugnancy unto right reaſon: And therefore there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are indifferent. This argument is thus managed by (*f*) *Durand*: That act is neither good nor evill, but indifferent,

(*f*) Ubi autem ratio non debet eſſe magis recta affirmando quã negando, ibi voluntas non debet magis conformari rationi affirmativæ quam negativæ: unde poteſt ſic argui. Ille actus nec eſt bonus, nec eſt malus, circa quem ratio non poteſt eſſe magis recta in affirmando quam in negando, ſed levare feſtucam, quantum eſt præciſè ex ratione, quam ſortitur actus ex objecto, eſt hujuſmodi, quia ratio neque affirmando quod levanda eſt, neque negando levandam eſſe magis recta eſt, ergo actus de ſe neque bonus eſt, neque malus. Major patet, quia perſecutio & fuga actus voluntatis quoad bonitatem vel malitiam correſpondent affirmationi, & negationi rationis practicæ quoad veritatem & falſitatem, & ideò ubi eſt ratio æque indifferens quoad veritatem, & falſitatem in affirmando & negando, ibi eſt actus indifferens quoad malitiam & bonitatem in proſequendo, & fugiendo. Minor probatur, quia rectitudo rationis conſiſtit in conformitate ad aliquam legem naturalem vel divinam vel ex his derivatam, circa autem tales actus, ut levare feſtucam, vel huiuſmodi, nulla lex aliquid determinat, nec divina, nec naturalis, nec ex his derivata, ergo circa eos ſic acceptos ratio non poteſt habere aliquam rectitudinem, vel obliquitatem magis in affirmando quam in negando, & hæc fuit minor. Sequitur ergo concluſio. lib. 2. diſt. 40. q. 1.

Concer-

Concerning which there is in the reaſon of man no more rectitude, or irrectitude and obliquity in the affirmation, then in the negation in it's dictating either the practice, or in its dictating the forbearance thereof. For the purſuit and eſchewall of the will are in regard of morall goodneſſe, or badneſſe correſpondent unto the dictates of the practicall underſtanding, and therefore where there is an indifferencie in point of truth in the underſtandings dictates concerning the doing, or not doing of a thing, there is an indifferency in regard of morall goodneſſe or badneſſe in the wills imbracing, or eſchewing of that thing. If the underſtanding erre not, whether it preſcribe the performance, or forbearance of an action, then the will ſinneth not, whether it performe or forbeare it: But there are divers acts concerning which there is in the reaſon of man no more rectitude, or irrectitude and obliquity in the affirmation, then in the negation of them, in its dictating the practiſe, or in its dictating the forbearance of them: This he proveth becauſe the rectitude of reaſon conſiſts in conformity unto ſome naturall law, or ſome divine law, or ſome law derived from theſe: But there are divers humane actions concerning which, there occurreth no ſuch law, either forbidding, or commanding: and therefore there is no rectitude or obliquity in the reaſons or underſtandings affirming or denying of them. It is indifferent, which way the underſtanding takes, whether it dictates the doing or not doing of them: and conſequently it is indifferent, whether the will willeth, or nilleth them. Here by the way I cannot but take notice, how *Durand* unawares croſſeth their doctrine of Evangelicall Counſels: for *Suarez (de leg. lib. cap. 14.)* will tell him, that *Counſell is not properly a Law*: By this doctrine of *Durand* then in matters of Counſell there ſhould be no rectitude of reaſon, becauſe no conformity unto any law: But this by the by.

This argument is yet further improved by (g) *Gregory de Valen-*

(g) Sunt quidem complures actus, quos dum præciſè conſideramus, ut verſantur circa hoc, vel illud objectum; nec laudamus, nec vituperamus tanquam bonos vel malos, ſed cenſemus eſſe indifferentes. Loquimur enim in propoſito de bonitate, & malitiâ morali propriè, ut ſcilicet bonitas non eſt qualiscunque congruentia cum ratione; & voluntate hominis, ſed congruentia ejuſmodi, ut habeat laudem ſecundùm æſtimationem hominum; tanquam aliquid, nempe quod quadret in rationem hominis, etiam ut recta eſt, & ut is habet ſibi à Deo propoſitam beatitudinem, ut ultimum finem. Quemadmodum etiam contra, malitia moralis, cui opponitur moralis bonitas, conſiſtit in repugnantiâ quâdam erga rationem rectam hominis, quæ ſecundum humanam æſtimationem habeat vituperium, tanquam aliquid repugnans, & nocens homini, ut is habeat beatitudinem propoſitam ſicut ultimum finem omnium actionum. Sic itaque loquendo proprie de bonitate, vel malitiâ morali affirmamus quoſdam eſſe actus, qui ex objecto ſuo nec boni, nec mali ſunt, ſed indifferentes. *Tom. 2. Com. Theol. qu. 13 punct. 2.*

tia. The Morall goodneſſe (ſaith he) which we ſpeake of, is ſuch a congruence unto reaſon, as carrieth praiſe with it according unto the uſuall eſtimate of men, and appertaineth unto mans everlaſting happineſſe, his chiefe, and ſoveraigne end; and anſwerably the morall ilneſſe or badneſſe of an action ſtands in ſuch a repugnancie unto right reaſon, as that according to the uſuall eſtimation of men, it is worthy of diſpraiſe, and is an impediment unto his attaining his ſupreame end, the eternall bliſſe of his ſoule; But now there are ſeverall humane actions that conſidered in themſelves have neither praiſe nor diſpraiſe, neither prejudice, nor advantage the ſalvation of our ſoules; are neither helps, nor lets unto the obtaining of our higheſt end and happineſſe, and therefore there are actions morally indifferent.

Unto what hath been ſaid, I ſhall adde two arguments more out of a late Philoſopher. *Irenæus*, A Carmelite or white Frier *(h)*

Firſt, upon actions morally good, or bad, we may lawfully paſſe our Cenſures; that they are ſuch; But we ſhould paſſe raſh judgment, if we ſhould cenſure Divers actions of our Bretheren to be determinately virtuous, or determinately vitious, moraly good or bad: *Let not him that eateth not judge him which eateth. Rom.* 14. 2. There are therefore ſome actions, which for their kind are neither good, nor bad, but indifferent.

Secondly, Many acts are evill, onely by the prohibition of ſome poſitive law; As unto the Jewes it was unlawfull to *eate Swines fleſh, to weare a garment of divers colours, as of woollen and linnen together*, *Deut.* 22. 11. Theſe actions therefore, and many the like, were of themſelves, and in their owne nature, indifferent, and became unlawfull onely by the ceremoniall law given unto the Jewes, which law being abrogated, it is now a thing indifferent and lawfull for Chriſtians to eate ſwines fleſh, or not to eate it, to weare a garment of linſey-woolſey, or not.

Unto theſe ſcriptures and reaſons I ſhall adde the teſtimony of *Hierome*, frequently quoted for this purpoſe. *Bonum, inquit,*

(h) Si omnis actus eſſet bonus aut malus ex ſuo objecto, ſeu ſuâ ſpecie, liceret nobis judicare de quolibet proximi opere, & tale ipſum aſſerere, quale habet objectũ, ſicuti actus ex objecto determinatospronuntiamusbonos, aut malos determinatè: ſed non licet ita de ſingulis Judicare, ex *Matth*: 7. cujus ratio eſt apud patres, & Interpretes quod plerique actus ſint medii, ſcilicet de ſe indifferentes, ut ſint boni, aut mali: ergo, &c.

Multi actus ſunt mali præciſe ratione ptohibitionis, *V.G.* portare arma de nocte: ergo ii ſunt ex ſpecie ſuâ indifferentes. *Ethic: cap*: 3. *Sect*: 2.

eſt

eſt continentia, malum eſt luxuria. Inter utrumque indifferens ambulare, capitis, naribus purgamenta projicere, ſputis rheumata jacere. Hoc nec bonum, nec malum eſt: ſivè enim feceris, ſivè non feceris, nec juſtitiam habebis, nec injuſtitiam. Ariſtotle, and Sextus Empyricus give in their verdict for the truth of this aſſertion, whoſe ſayings the reader may peruſe at large in *Raynaudus moral. diſciplin. diſtinct. 4. quæſt. 1. Art. 3. num. 39. pag. 550.*

There is but one Conſiderable *objection*, which I ſhall briefly propound and anſwere. Whatſoever agreeth unto the ſpecies, the ſort or kind of a thinge, agreeth unto all individuals contained under it, And therefore if there be humane actions, that be indifferent, *ſecundum ſpeciem*, according to their kind, the Individuals of ſuch actions are indifferent too, which will be oppoſed in a *third Concluſion:* That which doth agree unto a thing *per ſe*, the oppoſite thereof cannot agree unto it, either *per ſe*, or *per Accidens*: And therefore if ſome actions are *per ſe* of them ſelves indifferent, it is impoſſible for the Individuals of ſuch actions to be moraliy good, or evill.

Unto this obiection *Durand anſwereth*, by diſtinguiſhing of a *twofold ſenſe* of this expreſſion. An act is indifferent *ſecundum ſpeciem*, according to it's kind. *The firſt is*, that indifferency is of *the ſpecifick nature* of ſuch an act. And this ſenſe, which is the ſenſe of the objection, is falſe, for then it wou'd be impoſſible for any individuals of ſuch an act not to be indifferent: But now there is a ſecond ſenſe of the expreſſion, that the *ſpecifick nature of ſuch an action doth not involve, or imply in it's notion morall either goodneſſe*

(*i*) Dicendum eſt quod actum ſic indifferentem ſecundum ſpeciem ſuam poteſt intelligi dupliciter, ſcilicet ſecundum quod negatio importata per hoc quod eſt indifferens poteſt

duplicitet ordinari ad copulam verbalem: uno enim modo poteſt poſi poni, & ſic eſt ſenſus, qd de ratione ſpecificâ actus eſt, quod ſit indifferens et ſi iſto modo aliquis actus ſecundum ſpeciem eſſet indifferens. non ſolùm eſſet impoſſibile dare ſub tali ſpecie actum individualem indifferentem, immo impoſſibile eſſet ſub tali ſpecie dari actum, niſi indifferentem, quia ea quæ ſunt de ratione ſpeciei conveniunt omni individuo ſub tali ſpecie, ſed ſi nullus eſt actus indifferens ſecundum ſpeciem ſuam; ſub quo tamen ſenſu argumentum procedit. Alio modo poteſt negatio importata per hoc, quod eſt indifferens, præponi copulæ verbali ſub hoc ſenſu, quod de ratione ſpecificâ actus non eſt, quod ſit indifferenter, vel determinate bonus vel malus, ſed tamen utrunque poteſt ipſi per aliud convenire, ſicut homo ex ſuâ ſpecie non habet quod ſit determinate albus, vel determinate niger: et tamen per aliud ei utrunque iſtorum convenit. Et hoc modo ſunt multi actus qui ſunt indifferentes ſecundum ſuam ſpeciem, nullus tamen ſecundum individuum, quia individuum multa includit quoad exiſtentiam ſuam quæ ad rationem ſpeciei non pertinent. *Lib. 2. diſt. 40. q. 1.*

or ilneſſe, But is equally and indifferently abſtracted from both: And this ſenſe is true: It is not of the ſpecificke nature of many actions to be determinately good, or determinately evill; though they may be either by circumſtances. As for the confirmation which is added; *The anſwer unto it is uſually as followeth; A thing may be ſaid to agree unto another *per ſe, either poſitively, or negatively.*

**Moriſ. in Ethic. Murc: Phyſic.*

1. *Poſitively*, when it is predicated *in primo*, or *ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe*, when it is either an eſſentiall predicate, or proper paſſion: And thus it agreeth unto man to be a ſenſitive creature, to be indued with the powers of underſtanding, willing, laughing, &c: And in this ſenſe indifferency doth not agree *per ſe*, unto any humane voluntary actions, for then it would agree unto them alwaies, and in all places, ſo that it would be utterly impoſſible for the individuals of ſuch actions to be morally either good, or bad.

2. *Negatively*, When a thing of it ſelfe is not ſuch, although by accident it may be ſuch: And thus we may ſay of a man, that *per ſe* he is not white, he is not blacke, he is not tawny, he is not of an olive colour, or the like, becauſe each of theſe colours conſidered *ſeparately*, are *accidentall* unto the nature of man, conſidered in the generall, and in it ſelfe: And yet the individuals of the nature of man may ſome of them be white, ſome blacke, ſome tawny, ſome of an olive colour, or the like: Even ſo we may ſay of divers voluntary rationall actions of man; that *per ſe*, (conſidered, as deveſted from all circumſtances) they are indifferent, morally neither good, nor bad: becauſe morall goodneſſe and badneſſe is accidentall unto the nature of ſuch actions conſidered in themſelves, and yet the individuals of ſuch actions are all of them either good, or evil, as ſhall be cleared by the next concluſion, unto which before we proceed, let us make ſome application of this ſecond concluſion.

Againſt this doctrine of Indifferency there are two *failings*; one in *the defect*, Another in the *exceſſe*:

There are, *Firſt*, ſome, that faile in *the defect*, who know not the full extent of indifferency: and ſo either impoſe, as neceſſary, or condemne, as ſinfull, things that are in their owne nature indifferent. Thus in the primitive Romiſh Church there were ſome new converts, who abſtained from ſwines fleſh, and other meats prohibited by the ceremoniall law, as unlawfull, The uſe of which yet

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was indifferent and lawfull under the Goſpell: *I know, and am perſwaded* (ſaith *Paul,*) by *the Lord Jeſus, that there is nothing uncleane of it ſelfe. Rom.* 14. 14. Thus alſo amongſt the Corinthians there were ſome weake Chriſtians, that branded for Communion, and fellowſhip with Idolaters all eating of things offered unto idols, Though bought in the market, or eaten at private meetings; In both which yet *Paul* pronounceth in generall there was no unlawfulneſſe, 1. *Cor.* 10. 25, 27. Amongſt us there are divers perſons, that are doubtleſſe well affected in matters of Religion, and yet are too rigid in cenſuring as ſinnes divers innocent and harmleſſe recreations: This is an errour in, and conſequently a blemiſh unto the underſtanding: *Paul* calls it a weakneſſe in the faith, *Rom.* 14. 1. that is an imperfection in point of knowledg, and that *privative*, or blameable: For the faith and conſcience of indifferent things is never indifferent, we are never to judg a thing indifferent, to be either ſinfull or neceſſary. Our Saviours command, *John* 7. 24. Judge righteous judgment may be extended unto things and actions as well as perſons: Therefore as we are not to call good, evill, or evill, good; ſo neither are we to call things indifferent, either evill, or neceſſary. This is injuriouſly to ſtraiten the grand Charter of our Chriſtian liberty, and preſumptuouſly to make the narrow way to heaven narrower then ever God made it. Beſides, it openeth a gappe unto many miſchiefes, it filleth the Church of God with needleſſe, and endleſſe diſputes, it perplexeth the minds of many conſcientious people with unneceſſary and unprofitably ſcruples; it cauſeth many bitter and uncharitable cenſures, and occaſioneth many dangers: In the believing Jewes that lived in the Church of Rome, in *Pauls* time, there was but a little miſtake touching things indifferent, meats and daies; but how pernicious was the ſequele hereof? Hereupon the ſtrong deſpiſed the weake, and the weak judged the ſtrong, *Rom.* 14. And this was a great diſturbance unto the peace of the Church, and a great hinderance unto the comfortable communion of the Saints.

2. *Againſt* this doctrine of indifferency there are ſome, *ſecondly*, that faile in the *exceſſe*, who make things neceſſary or ſinfull, to be but indifferent. There be ſome, that hold obſervation of the Lords day, preaching of the word, in diſtinction from meer rea-

ding of it to be no ordinances of God, but things meerly indifferent; *Eraſtians* affirme that Church Government, and Eccleſiaſticall cenſures are onely matters of indifferency: The Heathens in the Apoſtles times generally ranked fornication amongſt things indifferent: The like eſtimate ſome of the Corinthians had of eating things offered to Idols, in the midſt of an Idols temple, at a religious feaſt of that Idol, which was a palpable communicating with Devils, and therefore a fact in it's own nature unlawfull: And ſome Travailers, that profeſſe themſelves Proteſtants, have as large and looſe Conſciences, as theſe Corinthians had; for they have the ſame opinion of being preſent at an idolatrous maſſe, and bowing to popiſh Idols. Dr *Peter Heylin* (as himſelfe informeth us) made no ſcruple of kiſſing a Crucifix, when it was deſired of him, to diſcriminate him from a Hugenot: No leſſe looſe were the Principles of the *Adiaphoriſts*, and *Flaccians* in Charles the 5th his time, who preſſed the *Interim*, which gave allowance to divers errours, and ſuperſtitions of the Church of Rome, as matters that were indifferent: Our Prelatiſts ever and anon in the controverſy of Symbolicall ceremonies alleadge their indifferencie as a thing without diſpute, which is never granted by us; however it may ſometimes for diſputation ſake be ſuppoſed. But what talke we of Ceremonies, whil'ſt ſome of greateſt note amongſt them have ſo eagerly pleaded for ſuch ſports, and paſtimes upon the Lords day as indifferent, which a devout Papiſt would reckon a groſſe profanation thereof? Now this latter failing againſt the Doctrine of indifferent actions, in a way of exceſſe, is as much againſt the Purity of the Church, as the former fayling, in a way of defect, was againſt the peace of the Church: It opens as wide a dore to all licentiouſneſſe and profaneneſſe to call good and evill indifferent, as it doth to call good evill, or evill good, and therefore a woe equally belongs unto it with this latter.

Secondly, we may be exhorted unto thankfulneſſe, Becauſe God hath indulged us Chriſtians a greater extent of our liberty about things indifferent, then he ever vouchſafed unto the Jewiſh Synagogue. Many things, in their own nature indifferent, were prohibited them by poſitive precepts, and ſo made unlawfull unto them; This was a yoak (ſaid *Peter*,) which they were unable

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to beare, *Acts* 15.10. Blessed therefore be God, who hath freed us from this yoake by our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath *abolished* in *his flesh* the law of *Commandments contained in Ordinances*, *Eph.*2. 15. So that now *all* (indifferent) *things are lawfull* unto us; *There is nothing uncleane of it selfe*, Rom.14.14. *all things indeed are pure*, Rom.14.20. *Unto the pure all things are pure*, *Tit.* 1.15. *Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused*, 1 *Timoth.* 4. 4.

There be *two waies*, unto which I shall direct for expressing our thankfulnesse for the inlargement of this our liberty. 1. *A stout asserting of it.* 2. *A due and discreet use of it.*

1. *A stout asserting of it* against Judaisme, Popery, or any other sect or party, that shall be so presumptuous towards God, and injurious towards us, as to abridg us thereof in any part. *Stand fast therefore in the liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not intangled againe with the yoake of bondage*, *Gal.* 5. 1. The Apostle would have us not to be intangled againe with the Jewish yoake of bondage; And there is the same reason, why in indifferent things we should decline any other yoake of bondage, which any man whatsoever should make, and attempt to put upon our necks: for liberty towards things indifferent is one branch of that liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free: and therefore we should stand fast against all opposers. But now in this our asserting of our Christian liberty we should use a great deale of moderation towards weake dissenting brethren: 'Tis the Advice which the Apostle *Paul* gives in the like case, *Rom.* 14. 3. *Let not him that eateth, despise him, that eateth not*: The eating of meats prohibited by the Mosaicall Law was after Christ's death indifferent; But yet there were among the Romans some weaklings in the faith, who thought the ceremoniall law still in force, and consequently judged, the eating of all meats therein forbidden, to be sinfull; Now the Apostle would not have those that were strong in the faith, that is, more knowing, better principled, and more fully instructed in the extent of their Christian liberty to despise, to disdaine, and contemne those poore soules for their ignorance, and weaknesse in judgment; But to reach out the right hand of fellowship unto them, to receive them into an intimate communion, to deale gently, and tenderly with them, restoring them in the spirit of meeknesse, with all possible prudence, and

caution: *Him, that is weak in the faith, receive you, but not to doubtfull diſputations, Rom.* 14.1. The Apoſtle doth not prohibite altogether all diſputations for the future touching the point in controverſy: for he himſelfe elſewhere very zealouſly diſputes the matter, only he interdicts ſuch diſputes as were unſeaſonable for the preſent: becauſe theſe Jewiſh converts were ſo extreamly wedded unto the Law of Moſes, as that to have preſt upon them in their firſt converſion an abolition thereof, was the ready way to have utterly prejudiced them againſt and alienated them from Chriſtianity: He would have them firſt to be taught *the firſt principles of the Oracles of God, the firſt Principles of the Doctrine of Chriſt, Heb.* 5.12. and *chap.* 6. *verſ.* 1. And when they were well principled, and ſetled in the Chriſtian faith, then they might proceed to a calme, and peaceable debate of this ſubject: for then their mind would be more capable of inſtruction, and the forementioned prejudice would be more eaſily removed: Indeed, after a while, there would be no place for ſuch a prejudice: for when once there was a plenary promulgation of the Goſpell, to obſerve them afterwards would be a *virtuall* abrenunciation of the Chriſtian Religion, a denyall, that Chriſt is come in the fleſh: When once the Apoſtles had gived the Jewiſh Synagogue and Ceremonies an honourable funerall, and reſpective buriall, for any man afterwards to revive the obſervation of them, would be to rake in their duſt, and ſacrilegiouſly to violate their grave: *Proindè nunc quiſquis Chriſtianorum, quamvis ſit ex Judæis, ſimilitèr ea celebrare voluerit, tanquam ſopitos cineres erucns, non erit pius deductor vel bajulus corporis, ſed impius ſepulturæ violator, Auguſt: Epiſt.* 19.

A ſecond way of expreſſing our thankfulneſſe for the extenſion of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent *is a due and diſcreet uſe of it*, ſuch an uſe of it as may ſt, and with Gods glory, and may be no waies inconſiſtent with our own or others edification. Touching this uſe of our liberty *Paul* gives us a generall caution, *Gal.* 5. 13. *only uſe not liberty for an occaſion unto the fleſh*; that is, to live according unto the fleſh. Suitable unto which alſo is the advice of St *Peter*, 1 *Pet.* 2.16. *not uſing your liberty for a cloake of maliciouſneſſe, But as the ſervants of God*: In which advice there are *two parts*: *One negative*: not uſing your liberty for a cloak of maliciouſneſſe:

maliciouſneſſe: that is, for a colour or pretence unto any ſinne for κακία is (as Dr *Sanderſon* well obſerveth) taken here more largly for all manner of evill and naughtineſſe, according unto the adequate ſignification of the Greek and Latine Adjectives, from whence the ſubſtantive uſed in the text is derived. *Another part of the advice is affirmative*, uſing your liberty as the ſervants of God: that is in the uſe of this liberty admit of nothing, that may be prejudiciall unto the ſervice, unto the honour and glory of God: for this would be a moſt unthankfull abuſe, and not a true uſe of it.

To informe us more fully, and particularly what we are to doe in this weighty point, I ſhall briefly propound ſuch reſtraints, as we are by the rule of Scripture to put on the uſe, and exerciſe of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent, for without ſuch reſtraints we can never uſe this our liberty aright, and as we ought: There be ſome looſe people, that are impatient of all theſe reſtraints: If they judg a thing lawfull in it ſelfe, they never conſider, or conſult farther, but without more adoe adventure on it: But theſe men ever and anon abuſe their libertie unto Gods diſhonour, their own danger, and the ſcandall of both brethren, and aliens: *They uſe their liberty as an occaſion to the fleſh, for a cloake of maliciouſneſſe*: He that gives himſelfe the full ſwing in things indifferent, He that will doe whatſoever is lawfull, will ſoone ſlide into things unlawfull, and ere he is aware indulge himſelfe in the practice of them: So *Clemens Alexandrinus* παχὺ, καταπίπτουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ δρᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔξον, οἱ πάντα δρῶντες ἃ ἔξον. 1. *Qui faciunt quicquid licet, huc cito delabuntur, ut faciant quod non licet.* For prevention of this licentiouſneſſe, I ſhall out of Gods word recommend unto you *ſix reſtraints* to be put upon this part of your Chriſtian liberty in the uſe and exerciſe of it, 1. *By Prudence.* 2. *By Temperance and Sobriety.* 3. *By Conſcience.* 4. *By Religion.* 5. *By Authority.* 6. *By Charity,*

1. *By Prudence*: which in indifferent things is, *firſt*, to compare them with thoſe ends which every Chriſtian ſhould ayme at. 2. To conſider whether there concurre not an obligation to ſome duty, or other.

Firſt then, It is the worke of Chriſtian prudence to compare indifferent actions with thoſe ends, which every Chriſtian ſhould propound

unto himſelfe: the glorifying of God, the ſalvation of his own ſoule, and the edifying of Brethren: And to examine whether they be expedient, or inexpedient, profitable and conducing, or unprofitable and impedient unto theſe ends: And if upon due conſideration it finds them inexpedient, an hinderance unto theſe ends, it then forthwith dictates a forbearance of them: Becauſe whatſoever is an impediment unto theſe ends is oppoſite unto them, and in that regard ſinfull: This reſtraint our Apoſtle layeth downe in way of Doctrine for the inſtruction of all. *All things are lawfull for me. But all things are not expedient*, 1 *Cor.* 6. 12. and *Chapt* 9. we have him putting it upon himſelfe in his own practiſe: It was lawfull for him to have received of the Corinthians a competent, and honourable maintenance, for his labour in the Word and Doctrine, as being a matter of due debt from them: But he did not exact it, but wrought with his hands for his livelyhood, becauſe he found it would have obſtructed, and hindered the end of his preaching, which was the ſpreading of the Goſpell, that the word of the Lord might have free courſe, and be glorified in the converſion of ſoules.

A ſecond act of Prudence about indifferent things is to conſider, whether in that nicke of time we are about an indifferent action there concurre not an obligation unto ſome duty or other; And if there doe, then prudence dictates, that *pro hic & nunc*, we ſhould abſtaine from that indifferent action, becauſe otherwiſe we ſhould preferre it above a neceſſary and commanded duty; And though it be ſimply in it ſelfe lawfull, it would become accidentally ſinfull, to wit, by compariſon; Thus it would be ſinfull for a man to walke in the fields, if there lay upon him at the ſame time an obligation to heare *ſuch* a ſermon: Thus alſo it would be ſinfull for a man to follow recreations in themſelves lawfull, when the neceſſities of his family call upon him to follow his occupation, the workes of his ordinary calling.

A ſecond Reſtraint (that we are to put upon the uſe of our liberty about things indifferent) *is by temperance and ſobriety*, and this reſtraint alſo we have laid downe by the Apoſtle in the place but now quoted. 1. *Cor.* 6. 12. *All things are lawfull for me, But I will not be brought under the power of any*: Now what is it that brings a man under the power of meates, and drinkes, apparell, recreations?

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but an over-vehement affection unto them. This makes man a vaſſall unto thoſe things, over which God hath given him a full Lordſhip, and dominion: *Qui nimis rem aliquam amat (ſaith Aquinas) quodam modo ſervus iſtius efficitur*, He that loves a thing overmuch, renders himſelfe thereby the ſervant thereof: *Know yee not that to whome yee yield your ſelves ſervants to obey, his ſervants yee are, to whom yee obey, Rom.* 6. 16. He that immoderately affects thoſe things, that are in themſelves indifferent, cannot diſobey, or reſiſt the leaſt temptation unto ſinne drawn from them, and therefore is no better then a ſlave unto them, nay an Idolater of them: You may ſee how *Paul* cenſures the falſe Prophets for ſuch an exceſſe, *Rom.* 16.18. *They that are ſuch ſerve not our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, but their owne belly, Their God is their belly Phil.* 3. 19. We may ſay the like of thoſe, that like the rich glutton, *Luke.* 16. 19. *fare ſumptuouſly or deliciouſly every day*, and will have a ſplendid retinue, when the lowneſſe of their ſtate requires a meaner table and ſmaller attendance; of thoſe that are wedded unto ſuch gaiety and bravery of apparell as is above their purſes, or unſuitable unto their age, and ranke; As alſo of thoſe that are ſo mad upon their recreations, ſports and paſtimes, as that in the purſuite of them they forgoe their meales, and ſleepe, they neglect the worſhip of God, and their particular callings, unto their great impoveriſhment, if not finall and totall beggery.

A third limitation upon the exerciſe of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent *is to be by conſcience*: for though a mans conſcience cannot legitimate ſinnes, either of Commiſſion, or Omiſſion; yet it is of force ſufficient to make that ſinfull, which is in it ſelfe indifferent, & lawfull: for this we have the Apoſtles determination, and that touching both *a condemning and doubting conſcience.*

1. *A Condemning Conſcience*, Rom. 14. 14. *I know and am perſwaded by the Lord Jeſus, that their is nothing uncleane of it ſelfe; But unto him that eſteemeth any thing to be uncleane, to him it is uncleane.* Unto the authority of *Pauls* Teſtimony I ſhall adde *two reaſons.*

1. Every man takes the voyce of his conſcience to be the voyce of God; And therefore he that doth a thing in it ſelfe indifferent againſt the judgement of his Conſcience, he diſobeyeth and ſlighteth the voyce of God, *as for the manner of* his action, and is a fighter againſt God.

A *ſecond* reaſon I ſhall give you in the words of *Willet* upon the place, *Becauſe the goodneſſe or badneſſe of an action is eſteemed by the will and affection of the doer; Now when he thinketh a thing to be evill, and yet doth it, It ſhewes that ſuch an one hath, deliberatam peccandi voluntatem, a deliberate mind and purpoſe to ſinne.*

The Apoſtle, *ſecondly*, gives us the ſame reſolution touching a *Doubting conſcience*, Rom. 14. 23. *He that doubteth, is damned if he eate, becauſe he eateth not of faith; for whatſoever is not of faith, is ſinne*: that is; he that performeth an indifferent action, and yet doubteth of the lawfulneſſe thereof, deſerveth damnation, becauſe he doth not act out of faith; for whatſoever we performe, though it be (*intrinſecally, in it ſelfe*) matter of indifferency; nay though it be matter of duty, yet if it proceed not from a beliefe of it's lawfulneſſe it becomes (*accidentally and extrinſecally*) ſinfull; It bewrayes a wicked and a wretched heart, that is not afraid of ſinne, but in a great readineſſe to commit it; who, almoſt would doe any thing that he doubteth would anger and grieve a deare friend? God then is not ſo deare as he ſhould be unto ſuch men, as dare adventure upon the practiſe of that, which they are doubtfull is diſpleaſing unto him: Let us therefore hearken unto that exhortation, which the Apoſtle gave unto the Romans concerning thinges indifferent, *Rom.* 14. 5. *Let every man be fully perſwaded in his owne minde*: And this exhortation he backes with a very good reaſon. *ver.* 22. *Happy is he which condemneth not himſelfe in that thing which he alloweth*: that is, he that doth not condemne as ſinneſull, that which he chooſeth and embraceth in his practiſe; ſuch a man is in *that reſpect, and ſo farre forth* happy, as being free from thoſe terrors, which torment thoſe, who do what their conſciences condemne.

Thus you ſee, that not only condemnation, but doubtfulneſſe of Conſcience is a ſufficient warrant to forbeare things that are in themſelves indifferent: *But yet it is no ground for us to aſſume a liberty of condemning the ſame things in others, who are ſufficiently ſatiſfied touching their indifferency and lawfulneſſe: Let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth. Rom.* 14. 3. Let not him that is weake in the faith, that out of ignorance cenſureth, or ſuſpecteth divers actions to be ſinneſull, which he cannot prove to be ſo by any convincing argument; Let not ſuch an one condemne for ſuch actions the

ſtrong

ſtrong in the faith, thoſe who are as godly and more knowing, then themſelves: This exhortation the Apoſtle enforceth by divers reaſons in the following words; *for God hath received him; who art thou, that judgeſt another mans ſervant? To his owne maſter he ſtandeth or falleth, yea, he ſhall be holden up; for God is able to make him ſtand, ver.* 3. 4.

The *firſt* argument is taken from *the relation of the ſtrong unto God, or Gods acceptation of them; for God hath received him*; to wit, into his favour, into an intimate union, and communion, into his family, as a ſervant, as a ſonne, as a member of his onely begotten ſonne: To condemne him then is to throw a diſhonour upon God himſelfe.

A *ſecond* reaſon is, Becauſe for the weake to condemne the indifferent actions of the ſtrong for ſinne, of which they cannot prove them guilty, *is a groſſe and preſumptuous uſurpation of Gods prerogative, for which we have no Authority: who art thou that judgeſt another mans ſervant?* Thou art but a fellow ſervant at the moſt: And God only is the maſter of the family, the Church: and therefore the unlawfulneſſe of what is done in it is to be determined by Gods precepts, and not by thy humour, or fancy, thy ungrounded ſurmiſes: If God hath permitted a thing, how dareſt thou interdict it? *To his own maſter he ſtandeth, or falleth.* The words are to be underſtood in a law-ſenſe, and their meaning is that God alone acquits or condemnes the actions of his ſervants, and none elſe: They are to be tryed by his word and will, and not by thy jealouſies, and ſuſpicions. Others expound the words thus: If a man eat and drink temperately with outward prayer and thankſgiving, who but God can diſcerne, whether he eat or drink unto the glory of God, or no? It followeth *he ſhall be holden up*: that is, he ſhall be juſtified. This fact of his, his eating of meats forbidden by the Leviticall Law, ſhall be abetted and maintained: *For God is able to make him ſtand*: though thou load him with cenſures, God is able to acquit, and cleare him.

4thly. Our Chriſtian liberty towards things indifferent muſt admit of a reſtraint in the outward practiſe of it *By Religion*, by the *Religion of a vow, of an oath*, Deut. 23. verſ. 21, 22, 23. *When thou ſhalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God, thou ſhalt not ſlack to pay it: for the Lord thy God will ſurely require it of thee, and it would*

be ſinne in thee. But if thou ſhalt forbeare to vow, it ſhall be no ſinne in thee. That which is gone out of thy lips, thou ſhalt keep, and performe: even a free-will offering, according as thou haſt vowed unto the Lord thy God, which thou haſt promiſed with thy mouth. It was indifferent for *Ananias* to have ſold, or held his poſſeſſion: But when once by ſolemne vow he had devoted it unto God, to keep back any part of the price in his own hand, was no leſſe then ſacriledge: Suppoſe Luſory lots be in themſelves lawfull, yet if a man ſwear, that he will never play more at Cardes, or Tables, &c. By this Oath a man hath bound himſelfe from ſuch games for the future: and if he play at them, he ſhall incurre the guilt of perjury: *Numb.* 30. *v.* 2. *If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or ſweare an Oath to bind his ſoule with a bond, he ſhall not breake his word, he ſhall doe according unto all that proceedeth out of his mouth.* *Calviniſt's* about oath's concerning things indifferent have this caſe: Whether they be obligatory in trifles? As if a man ſhould ſweare to lift up a ſtraw, to rub his beard, to give an apple, to lend a pinne unto a Child: This caſe (*k*) Dr *Sanderſon* thus anſwereth. 1. *He premiſeth that ſuch oath's are unlawfull*, Becauſe in them Gods moſt Holy Name is taken in vaine, The Great God of Heaven and Earth is appealed unto, and called upon to witnuce intereſt

(*k*) Caſus poſterior eſt, cum res aut ob ſui levitatem indigna eſt viri prudentis deliberatione, nec caſſâ

feceriſne an non feceris, ut levare feſtucam de terrâ, fricare barbam &c. aut ob parvitatem materiæ non eſt multum eſtimabilis; ut dare pomum puero, aciculam commodare &c. Juramentum de re iſto ſenſu adiaphora omnino eſt illicitum. Arguit enim ſancti nominis Dei aut nimiam irreverentiam, ſi (ut ferè fit) ex quodam habitu jurandi longo uſu contracto imprudenti fortè exciderit; aut apertum contemptum, ſiquis id ſciens prudenſque admiſerit, ſcilicet non eſt Deus advocandus teſtis, niſi ubi dignus vindice nodus inciderit: ubi cauſa exigit non juſta modo ſed & gravis. Et in hoc omnes conſentiunt, cæterum de obligatione quid ſtatuendum? Video quidem pleroſque caſuiſtas pontificios in eâ eſſe ſententiâ juramentum de re exiguâ et parvi momenti eſſe ſuâ naturâ nullum, & non obligare: quia ſcilicet res levis non eſt idonea materia juramenti, & lex non curat de miminis. Sed miror potuiſſe eos, qui aliàs videri volunt eſſe tam Lynceï, in re tam apertâ cæcutire: niſi quod putidæ illi diſtinctioni peccati mortalis & venialis, quo velut fermento totam Theologiæ moralis maſſam fædè corruperunt, locum relictum cupiant. Sed obligare juramentum in re vel leviſſimi momenti conſtat; primò, quia in re gravi & levi eadem eſt veritatis & falſitatis ratio. Secundò, quià in aſſertorio juramento, qui aliter dicit quam res eſt, etſi in re leviſſimâ, pejerat, ergo à ſimili & in promiſſorio, qui aliter facit, quam juravit. Tertio, quià aliter, quantum in ſe eſſet, Deum faliæ rei teſtem faceret. Quartò, quià omnis jurans tenetur facere totum quod promiſit, quatenùs poteſt, & licet: ſed dare puero pomum, & poſſibile eſt, & licitum, ergò tenetur præſtare, non debuit ergò ſic jurari: ſed ubi juratum eſt, debet impleri. De Juramen: Obligat: prælect: 3. *Sect.* 15.

neſſe

neſſe unto toyes: But yet notwithſtanding *his reſolution is, that ſuch oath's binde*; and for it he giveth foure reaſons.

1. Truth and falſehood have place in a light, as well as in a ſerious matter.

2. Becauſe in an aſſertory Oath, He that ſaith otherwiſe then the thing is, though it be in a moſt triviall matter, is forſworne: therefore by the like reaſon, he is perjured in a promiſſory oath, that doth otherwiſe, then he hath ſworne.

3. Becauſe Otherwiſe, he that hath taken ſuch an oath, ſhould make God as much as in him lieth the witneſſe of a falſehood.

4. Becauſe every one that ſweareth, is bound to doe all that he hath ſworn, ſo farre forth as he is able, and ſo farre forth as the thing is lawfull to be done: But the matters here ſpoken of are poſſible and lawfull, v. gr. it is poſſible and lawfull to give a child an apple, &c. therefore ſuch oath's are to be performed: Indeed ſuch vaine oath's ſhould not be taken, but being once taken they ought to be fulfilled.

A *fift* reſtraint upon the exerciſe of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent is by *the juſt commands of authority, unto which we muſt be ſubject for conſcience ſake, Rom. 13. v. 5.* The Apoſtle *Peter* having, 1 *Pet.* 2. 13. 14. exhorted us to *ſubmit our ſelves unto every ordinance of man for the Lords ſake*; In *verſ.* 16. (by the generall conſent of interpreters) he prevents an obiection, that might be made againſt this ſubmiſſion, from our Chriſtian liberty, *As free, and not uſing your liberty for a Cloake of maliciouſneſſe, but as the ſervants of God*: Upon which words it is well obſerved by *Eſtius* (out of *Oecumenius* and *Chryſoſtome*) that, *As free* is to be conſtrued with ὑποτάγητε, *ſubmit your ſelves*: And not (as *Bede* would have it) with *well doing*. And from this *connexion* we may learne *two things*.

Firſt, That in ſubmiſſion unto every ordinance of man, wee muſt not infringe our Chriſtian liberty: We muſt not enſlave our ſelves to ſinne, Sathan, and the World.

Secondly, That ſubmiſſion unto every Ordinance of man, and our Chriſtian freedome may very well ſtand together: We may ſubmit our ſelves as free: we may be obedient ſubiects, and yet free Chriſtians: This may alſo be further gathered from what

the Apoſtle hath in the following words touching the abuſe, and uſe of our Chriſtian liberty; *Not uſing your liberty as a cloake for maliciouſneſſe, but as ſervants of God*: Here we have. 1. A *dehortation* from the abuſe of our Chriſtian liberty, *not uſing your liberty as a cloake of maliciouſneſſe*: now to alleadge it as a plea for exemption of us from the yoake of temporall dominion, is to uſe it as a cloake of maliciouſneſſe; for not onely ſcripture, but even nature it ſelfe condemneth diſobedience unto, and rebellion againſt magiſtrates, as a very High point of maliciouſneſſe, that is naughtineſſe, and wickedneſſe.

2. *We* have here a *Direction* unto a right uſe of our liberty, uſing it *as the ſervants of God*: Now the ſervice of God is ſo farre from being a barre, as that it is rather a ſpurre unto this ſubjection; for *Firſt*, it is for the Lords ſake, that *Peter* would have us to *ſubmit our ſelves unto every ordinance of man*, verſ. 13. *Secondly*, How can he cordially ſerve God, that contemnes and diſobeyes his deputy, and miniſters? ſo the Apoſtle ſtiles the magiſtrate, *Rom.* 13.4,6. And *Thirdly*, The ſervants of God are obliged to yeild obedience unto all his commands, and one of them is to *be ſubject unto the higher powers*, *Rom.* 13.1. They then that reſiſt the higher powers doe not uſe their liberty *as the ſervants of God*.

But now, (that we may not runne into another extreame, and with the flatterers of ſtates, and Princes, extoll the power of the magiſtrate beyond all bounds of moderation;) I ſhall deſire you to take notice, that the power of the magiſtrate in things indifferent is not *arbitrary*, but is to be limited by *the end of all Magiſtracy, the publick good*, Rom. 13.4. *He is the Miniſter of God unto thee for good*. Unto this publick good ſome indifferent things carry a tendency, and ſuch the magiſtrate may command; unto it others may be prejudiciall, and ſuch he may forbid: But now he ſhould abuſe his power, and play the tyrant, If he ſhould injoyne things unprofitable; As if he ſhould command men to throw ſtones into the water, to pick ſtrawes, to ſcatter feathers into the aire, or the like. By this you may ſee, that the legiſlative power of the temporall magiſtrate in things indifferent is not unlimited: *But now as for Eccleſiaſticall ſuperiours, They have no commiſſion for to make any lawes properly ſo called*. To make this good *Ames* quotes *Junius* againſt *Bellarmine*, [*cont.* 3. *lib.* 4. *cap.* 16. *n.* 86,87.

and

and *chap.* 17. *n.* 9, 10, 12, 13.] where he ſheweth, that *Chriſt is the onely* law-giver, that *appoinʒeth things in his Church, and that he hath appointed all that are requiſite, and that the Church maketh no lawes* (*properly ſo called*) *to appeint any new things to be uſed, but onely canons, orders, directions, ordering in ſeemly manner thoſe things which Chriſt hath appointed: and that if ſhe adde* any *thing of her own,* ſhe *doth decline*: And the reaſon is, *Becauſe unto her is committed no authority of appointing new things, but a miniſtry to obſerve, and doe ſuch things which Chriſt hath appointed.*

[*This argument is proſecuted at large By* Ames *in his Reply unto* Morton *chap.* 1. *Sect.* 16. *and vindicated in his freſh ſuit againſt Ceremonies, pag.* 64, 65, 66. *uſque ad* 71. *from the rejoynder of* Dr John Burgeſſe.]

The *ſixth* and laſt reſtraint, which I ſhall mention, that is to be put upon the outward exerciſe of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent *is by Charity*: and that. 1. *Unto our ſelves.* 2. *Unto others.*

1. *Unto our ſelves*: He that truly loves himſelfe, will deny himſelfe the uſe of things indifferent, if he think it will hazard the health of his better part, his ſpirituall and immortall ſoule; He will forbeare thoſe ſports, and Paſtimes he moſt delights in, if he find that they uſually tempt him to Choler, or covetouſneſſe: He will not ſo much as ſtep into a Taverne, Inne, or Alehouſe, if he find himſelfe prone unto exceſſe: According unto the advice, that *Solomon* gives in the like caſe, *Prov.* 23. 2. *Put a knife unto thy throat, if thou be a man given unto appetite:* Our Saviour exhorts us *to pluck out our right eye, and to cut off our right hand, when they offend us, Matth.* 5. 29, 30. And *Maldonate* ſuppoſeth that he ſpeaks literally of a true eye and hand indeed: neither (ſaith he) is there any abſurdity in ſuch a ſenſe: becauſe the plucking out of the right eye, and the cutting off the right hand is mentioned only in a way of *hyperbolicall exaggeration.* In which there is underſtood ſuch an exception, as is uſuall in the like caſes, *if it might be, if it were lawfull*: He parallels it with a hyperbole of the ſame nature in *Gal.* 4. 15. *I beare you record, that if it had been poſſible, yee would have pluckt out your own eyes, and have given them unto me; If it had been poſſible*: that is, as *Eſtius gloſſeth* it, *ſi natura permitteret*, If nature would give way unto ſuch a mutilation: Our Sa-

viour therefore ſignifieth, that we muſt incurre the greateſt loſſe, rather then expoſe our ſelves unto the danger of ſinne: And from this we may conclude that we muſt caſt away our moſt beloved indifferences, when once they ſcandalize us, that is, when they prove occaſions of, and incernives unto ſinne.

2. *Charity towards others* ſhould put a reſtraint upon the uſe of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent, and make us to forbeare all indifferent things whatſoever, that may deſtroy the ſoules, weaken, or *wound the Conſciences of others*, 1 Cor. 8. 12. *Uſe not liberty for an occaſion to the fleſh, but by love ſerve one another*, *Gal.* 5. 13. Where the *Antitheſis* implied in the particle, *but*, plainly ſheweth, that we uſe our liberty for an occaſion unto the fleſh, if we do not by love ſerve one another, in the exerciſe thereof. *Knowledg puffeth up, but charity edifieth.* 1 Cor. 8. 1. that is, a firme and full knowledg of our liberty in things indifferent, if it be ſeparated from Charity, is apt to ſwell the mind with pride, and make men to deſpiſe, or ſet at naught weak, doubting, and ſcrupulous Brethren; But Charity edifieth, that is it is careſull to build up others, as living ſtones in the ſpirituall houſe of God, the Church; It inclineth to promote their graces, and gracious practiſes, and to avoide whatſoever is of a deſtroying nature unto their ſoules, that is, every thing that may occaſion their fall into ſin: Now that indifferent things may ſometimes be of an unedifying and deſtroying nature, the Apoſtle affirmeth 1 *Cor.* 10. 23. *All things are lawfull for me, but all things edifie not*, do not build up our brethren in truth, faith, and holineſſe, do not farther them in their Religion, charity, and juſtice: for that the Apoſtle ſpeaks of the edification of others is plaine by what followeth in the next verſe, *Let no man ſeek his own* (that is, only) *but every man anothers wealth*, that is, ſpirituall, the edification and ſalvation of anothers ſoule. And therefore indifferent things are to be forborne in caſe of ſcandall, when they prove to be of a deſtructive nature unto the ſoules of men, when they weaken their graces, hinder their duties, and lead them into ſin. This courſe the Apoſtle preſcribes unto the Romanes in the caſe of things legally uncleane before the coming of Chriſt. Thoſe that were ſtrong in the faith among them, well inſtructed in the doctrine of Chriſtian liberty, knew very well, that the legall unclean-

cleaneſſe of meates and drinkes, all Jewiſh feſtivalls and faſts were removed by Chriſts death, and that nothing was now of it ſelfe uncleane, but all things indifferent and lawfull: yet the Apoſtle would have them in the uſe of this point of Chriſtian liberty not to ſcandalize thoſe, that are weak in the faith, that is, ſuch as (being newly wonne from Judaiſme to Chriſtianity) were as yet unin-ſtructed about the ceſſation of Ceremonialls, *Rom.* 14. 13. *Judge this rather, that no man put a ſtumbling block, or occaſion, to fall in his brothers way*; that is in the uſe of meats and drinkes, that were before the Goſpell Levitically uncleane, and neglect of Jewiſh Feſtivalls and faſts, the obſervation of which was for a while indifferent, untill the interrement of the Ceremoniall law: For however the words run generally, yet if we look to the coherence backwards, the foregoing part of the chapter ſpeaks onely of ſuch things, meates, drinkes, and daies: and if we look to the coherence forwards, it ſpeaks onely of ſuch things, meats and drinks, *verſ.* 15. *Deſtroy not him with thy meate, for whom Chriſt died*, ver. 17. *for the kingdome of God is not meat and drinke.* v. 20. *for meate deſtroyes not the worke of God: it is evill for that man who eateth with offence: It is evill* not *ſimply* in it ſelfe, but *accidentally* by ſcandall. And therefore I ſhall conclude, that the place is in a ſpeciall manner appliable againſt ſcandalizing by abuſe of liberty in things indifferent.

Interpreters gheſſe at *three* things, wherein the practiſe of the ſtrong amongſt the Romanes might ſcandalize the weake.

1. *It might unſettle them in, and diſtaſt them againſt the Chriſtian Religion*: for they might hereupon think it to be contrary unto the Law of Moſes, which they ſo highly reverenced, and ſo at laſt it might occaſion their relapſe unto Judaiſme. 2. *It might embolden them to ſinne againſt their conſciences*, by eating that which they thought to be uncleane. And 3dly, *it might grievouſly exaſperate them*, and provoke them to powre out many a bitter, uncharitable, and ſinfull cenſure upon the actions, and ſtate of thoſe that were ſtrong in the faith.

In *verſ.* 21. The Apoſtle proceedeth to inlarge his doctrine touching this particular, beyond the controverſy, that occaſioned this his diſcourſe: for (as *Eſtius* well noteth) He teacheth, that to avoid the ſcandall and offence of our Brethren we are to abſtaine, not onely from things prohibited by the law, but alſo from things

not

not prohibited,from fleſh,wine,and any indifferent thing whatſoever: *It is good neither to eat fleſh, nor to drinke wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother ſtumbleth,or is offended, or is made weake. It is good,* that is,it is *morally* good. 1. Good *in regard of God,* a thing very acceptable, and pleaſing unto him. 2. Good *in regard of our Brethren*, profitable and conducing unto their edification. 3. Good *in regard of our ſelves*, a duty that God requireth of us: And from this we may inferre that the contrary hereof is (by the rule of contraries) morally evill: it is diſpleaſing unto God, hurtfull unto the ſoule of thy Brother,and ſinfull in thy ſelfe.

In *verſ.*22. The Apoſtle prevents an objection of the ſtrong: *Haſt thou faith, have it to thy ſelfe before God*: He ſpeaks not of a faith (ſaith *Chryſoſtome*) that is περὶ τῶν δογμάτων of doctrines and tenets,to wit,ſuch as are fundamentall, and neceſſary unto ſalvation: but of a faith, περὶ τῆς προκειμένης κατασκευῆς, concerning the ſubject matter here handled, meats, and dayes, things indifferent, a beliefe touching their lawfulneſſe: the ſtrong amongſt the Romans might be ready to obiect, that their knowledg and perſwaſion of their Chriſtian liberty in the matter controverted amounted unto a Divine faith: for it was built upon a divine Revelation: Each of them might ſay as *Paul* did above verſ. 14. *I know, and am perſwaded by the Lord Jeſus, that nothing is uncleane of it ſelfe.* The Lord Jeſus hath taught me this liberty now is it not fit,that my practiſe ſhould be agreeable unto my beliefe, that I ſhould exerciſe my knowledg, and act according unto my judgment: ſeeing it is ſo well grounded, why ſhould I forbeare the doing of that, which I know to be lawfull? Unto this the Apoſtles anſwer is, that they ſhould not make a vaine oſtentation, or unſeaſonable diſcovery of their faith: that is,knowledg, and perſwaſion, unto the offence of their Brother, the hazard of his ſoule: but rather in ſuch a caſe conceale it, and content themſelves with Gods knowledg,and approbation of it, who *ſeeth in ſecret,and will reward openly, Matth.*6. *Haſt thou faith,have it to thy ſelfe before God:* This prudent and charitable management of Chriſtian liberty, the Apoſtle exhorts the Corinthians unto, in their carriage towards their Brethren touching things offered unto Idols. 1 *Cor.* 8. 9. *take heed leſt, by any meanes this liberty of yours become a ſtumbling block to them that are weake. In Chapt.*10. he determineth, that it was lawfull

lawfull to eat things conſecrated to the Idols, and he inſtanceth in two caſes. 1. *When they were ſold in open markets. verſ.*25. 2ly, *When they were made uſe of at private feaſts*: But unto this his determination he ſubjoyneth the exception of ſcandall,*verſ.* 28.29. *If any man ſay unto you this is offered in ſacrifice unto idols, eat not,for his ſake that ſhewed it,*and for *conſcience ſake*; *The earth is the Lords and the fulneſſe thereof. Conſcience*; *I ſay, not thine own, but of the others*: *for why is my liberty judged of another mans conſcience?* This ſome underſtand of the unbelieving Idolater, others of a weake brother: And indeed this practiſe gives an wound unto both their conſciences. 1. *The Idolater triumphes*, becauſe he thinks it an honour unto his Idol, and ſo he is confirmed, and hardned in his Idolatry: And then, 2ly, *As for the weake Brother, he ſuppoſeth,that the meat is ſo polluted by Conſecration and ſacrifice unto Idols, as that to eat thereof is a compliance with Idolatry*; and therefore altogether ſinfull;and hereupon the eating of theſe meats by the ſtrong may occaſion in the weak *two ſcandalls*. 1. The example of the ſtrong may *intice them unto imitation*; and ſo they will ſinne againſt their conſciences. 2ly, The practiſe of the ſtrong may *provoke them unto raſh and uncharitable judgment*: both ſcandals give a great blow unto the Conſcience of the weake: But, that the Apoſtle ſpeaks of the latter ſcandall, I am induced to think by the words following: *Why is my liberty judged of another mans Conſcience?* that is, why doe I needleſſely,indiſcreetly, and unſeaſonably expoſe my Chriſtian liberty unto the raſh cenſures of a weake Brother, who may be ready to traduce it, as a prophane licentiouſneſſe? why ſhall I drive him upon a ſin, which I may prevent by a prudent and charitable forbearance of the exerciſe of my liberty? Liberty is a thing, which men out of an exceſſive ſelfe love ſo much overvalue,as that they are very impatient of any reſtraint to be put upon it at all: But the Reſtraint, that Charity prompts us unto, is of all others moſt diſregarded; becauſe there is nothing almoſt, that is ſo much undervalued, as the precious ſoules of our poore Brethren,and therefore we make but little conſcience how thick we throw ſcandals in their way: I ſhall therefore briefly propound ſuch weighty,and preſſing arguments, as the Apoſtle uſeth to perſwade the Romans,and Corinthians to abſtaine from a ſcan-

dalous uſe of their liberty in things otherwiſe indifferent, and lawfull: and they are drawn, either, *from the nature of things indifferent, or from the nature of ſcandall.*

1. *From the nature of things indifferent*: and here, the *firſt argument* is Rom. 14. 17. *the kingdome of God is not meate and drinke*: It doth not ſtand in indifferent things; for they are neither the way to the kingdome of Glory, nor our duty under the kingdome of grace: They are no part of Gods worſhip, and ſervice, no matter of Religion: the weale and ſafety of Gods people is in no wiſe wrapt up in them; nay, many times a rigid preſſing, and unſeaſonable practice of them is a great diſturbance unto the peace, and a great hinderance unto the edification of the Church, the kingdome of Chriſt.

A ſecond Argument from the nature of things indifferent, is *the great latitude of them*: Though ſome of them be ſcandalous, yet there will ſtill remaine an ample field of them beſides, 1 *Cor.* 10. 28. *If any man ſay unto you, this is offered in ſacrifice unto idols, eat not for his ſake, that ſhewed it, &c. the earth is the Lords, and the fulneſſe thereof*: It is as much as if he had ſaid; though ye abſtaine from things offered unto idols, yet there is no doubt of want, no feare of pinching your bellies: for you have the earth, and the fulneſſe thereof for your ſupply: And from the ſcandall by meats, we may argue in like manner touching the ſcandall by recreation: If cards, dyce, tables offend thy brother, there is plenty enough of other ſports, bowling, cheſſe, draughts, &c.

A ſecond ſort of arguments, that the Apoſtle inſiſts on, are taken *from the nature of ſcandall:* It is a ſinne againſt that tender love, which we owe unto our brethren: *And when ye ſinne ſo againſt the brethren*, 1 Cor. 8. 12. (And that 'tis no ſmall, but a very hainous ſinne, the next words evince) *And wound their weake conſcience*, The words are τύπτοντες αὐτῶν τὴν συνείδησιν ἀσθενοῦσαν, where (as *Beza* well obſerveth,) the Antecedent is put for the conſequent, beating, ſtriking, or ſmiting for the effect thereof, wounding: As weapons or whips wound the body; ſo ſcandalls the conſcience. Unjuſtly to wound the body, the face, the eye of our Brother is a cruell and inhumane part; but to wound ſo tender a piece as his conſcience, to wound a weake, a ſicklie, a diſeaſed conſcience is the very height of inhumanity. To wound

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the ſoule of a Brother *with ſorrow*, is a breach of charity; *If thy Brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkeſt thou not charitably*, Rom.14.15. And hence we may reaſon in a way of compariſon *à minori ad majus*, that to wound the ſoule of a Brother *with ſinne*, violates Chriſtian love in a farre higher meaſure; for the wound of the leaſt ſinne is in its own nature mortall; and therefore ſcandall is not onely of a wounding, but of a killing and deſtroying nature; it is a ſoule murder, *Deſtroy not him with thy meat*, Rom.14.15. Indeed the weak, that were ſcandalized, might by Gods mercy, and Chriſt's merit, eſcape an actuall deſtroying and damning: But the Apoſtles meaning is, that the ſtrongs ſcandalizing of them carried in it's nature a tendency towards their deſtruction: for it drew them into ſinne, and ſinne without repentance will deſtroy the ſoule: This malignant and deſtructive efficacy of ſcandall the Apoſtle urgeth alſo unto the *Corinthians Epiſtle* 1. *chapt.*8 *v.*11. *And through thy knowledg ſhall thy weake brother periſh*: that is, through thy ſcandalous abuſe of thy knowledg of thy liberty in eating things offered unto idols, thou ſhalt doe, what lieth in thee, to farther the periſhing of thy weake Brother: This cruelty that is in ſcandall towards the ſoules of our Brethren, is aggravated from *Chriſts Redemption*, *Gods Creation* of their ſoules.

1. *From Chriſts Redemption of their ſoules*: *Deſtroy not him with thy meat for whom Chriſt died, Rom.*14.15. *And through thy knowledg ſhall the weake brother periſh, for whom Chriſt died? But when ye ſin ſo againſt the Brethren, and wound their weak conſcience, ye ſinne againſt Chriſt*: 1Cor 8. 11,12. In the judgment of charity thou art to rank thy weake Brother in the number of thoſe, for whom Chriſt dyed: Chriſt died for his ſalvation, and how dareſt thou oppoſe his worke by doing that ,which tends unto his damnation? Chriſt parted with his life to ſave him, and wilt not thou for that end abridg thy ſelfe of thy liberty in a few indifferent things.

2. *From Gods creation of their ſoules: for meat deſtroy not the worke of God, Rom.* 14. 20. that is the ſoule of thy brother: for that is ſtiled Gods worke in a way of *eminency*: becauſe it was one of the choyceſt, chiefeſt, and moſt eminent workes of the Creation, made as it were with the conſultation of the whole Trinity, and

had in it engraven the very Image of God himſelfe: Therefore not only the defacing, but the very attempting to deface this would redound very much unto the diſhonour of the worker God; And he will doubtleſſe accordingly reſent the deſpiſing of his workmanſhip: Some interpreters expound the place of the work of Gods grace in the ſanctification, or regeneration of the ſoule, wherein faith is begotten, and that faith in a peculiar manner is the worke of God, we have Chriſts own teſtimony, *John* 6.29. *Jeſus anſwered, and ſaid unto them, this is the worke of God, that ye believe on him, whom he hath ſent*: But even ſo the words diſplay the horrid malignancy of ſcandall: for they ſhew that he who ſcandalizeth his brother, fighteth againſt God; that he goeth about to demoliſh that, which hath God alone for the builder. It was a part of Chriſts character not to *breake a bruiſed reed, nor quench the ſmoaking flax*, *Mat.*12.20. How unſuitable unto this, is the diſpoſition of thoſe by whom offences come? For they doe what lieth in them to quench the very beginnings of grace, and goodneſſe. Indeed the worke of Gods grace is ſo all-powerfull, as that it will finally prevaile againſt all reſiſtance: If God have *begunne a good worke, he will performe it untill the day of Jeſus Chriſt*, *Phil.* 1.6. *And the gates of hell ſhall never be able to prevaile againſt it*, Matth.16.18. But yet the gates of hell will be ever hindering of it: and in eſpeciall by the ſpreadth of ſcandals. And this very oppoſition is a warre againſt heaven, (in the language of the Scripture) a deſtroying of the worke of God. There is one ſequele more of active ſcandals of this nature, that our Apoſtle mentioneth, *Rom.*14. and 1*Cor.*10. which deſerveth alſo our conſideration: and it is the blot of infamy, which they will contract unto our names, and the very Chriſtian liberty, which we abuſe: A ſcandall in this caſe, *tending unto ſinne*, is uſually accompanied with a *ſcandall tending unto diſgrace*, or defamation: And how carefull we ſhould be to decline ſcandall, even in this Engliſh ſenſe of the word, the vehemency of the Apoſtles interrogations will ſufficiently informe us, 1 *Cor.* 10. 29, 30. *Conſcience, I ſay, not thine own, but of the others: for why is my liberty judged of another mans conſcience? for, if I by grace be a partaker, why am I evill ſpoken of, for that for which I give thanks?* Unto theſe interrogations adde we the Apoſtles precept alſo, *Rom.* 14. 16. *Let not then your*

good

good be evill ſpoken of: that is, give none occaſion for this great priviledg of your Chriſtian liberty to be traduced.

Before I take my leave of this reſtraint of our liberty by Charity in the caſe of ſcandall, I ſhall examine the reſtraints, that ſome have put upon it, without any warrant from ſcripture: Thoſe in which they moſt confide, are two. 1. *They limit it unto the ſcandall of the weake*, and, 2. *Unto matters that are undetermin.d by Authority*.

1. *They* limit it unto the *ſcandall of the weake*: for the ſcandall of the malicious, and preſumptuous perſons, The ſcandall of *Phariſes* (ſay they) may be neglected, Mat. 15.12,14. whether in our Ceremonies there was an active ſcandall, a ſcandall given will be largely diſputed in the next treatiſe, for the preſent therefore we ſhall only prove that we are to avoid ſuch an active ſcandall in the malicious, as well as the weake.

For *Firſt*, Such a ſcandall is of a ſoule deſtroying nature: *Deſtroy not him with thy meate*, *Rom.* 14.15. And who ſo wicked, and malicious upon the face of the earth, whoſe ſoule a true Chriſtian charity will exclude from it's care, mercy, and compaſſion.

Secondly, The Apoſtles motive reacheth unto the wicked and malicious: *Deſtroy not him with thy meat, for whom Chriſt died*, *Rom.* 14.15. for they may be in the number of thoſe, for whom Chriſt died, who for their preſent ſtate and condition may be moſt wicked, and malicious; ſuch as oppoſe themſelves, ſuch as are in the ſnare of the Devill, taken captive by him at his will.

3. The Apoſtles prohibition, 1 *Cor.* 10.32. extendeth unto the malicious, as well as the weake, *Give none offence neither to the Jewes, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the Church of God*: where Jewes and Gentiles are diſtinguiſhed from the Church of God; and therefore by them are meant ſuch as were unconverted, and as yet enemies unto the faith of Chriſt, and Church of God. And the things wherein the Apoſtle would have their offence to be avoided were matters of indifferency; *Whether ye eat or drinke*, *v.* 31. But now, leſt ſome ſhould be ready to object unto *Paul* that which our Saviour ſaid of the Scribes and Phariſees, *Matth.* 23.4. *that he did binde a heavy burden and grievous to be borne, and*

lay it upon mens ſhoulders: but he himſelfe would not move it with one of his fingers: the Apoſtle in the next verſe ſheweth, how that his practice was conformable unto his precept, *Even as I pleaſe all men* (good and bad) *in all things* (that is, in all indifferent things) *not ſeeking mine own profit, but the profit of many that they may be ſaved*, 1 *Cor.* 10. 33.

In a *ſecond place*, the Fautors of our Ceremonies limit this reſtraint of our liberty in things indifferent by charity, in the caſe of ſcandall, onely *unto things undetermined by Authority.* Where Authority hath determined our choice, we muſt (ſay they) hold to their determination, any ſcandall to the Contrary notwithſtanding. It ſeems then in caſe the magiſtrate command it, *we may wound the weake conſciences of our Brother, Deſtroy with our indifferencies, the worke of God, him for whom Chriſt died. It is good* (ſaith *Paul*) *neither to eat fleſh, nor to drinke wine, nor any thing whereby thy Brother ſtumbleth, or is offended, or is made weake*, *Rom.* 14. 22. But our *Prelatiſts* determine quite otherwiſe, if authority enjoyne it, it is good (ſay they) to eat bread, drink wine, weare a ſurplice, uſe the ſigne of the croſſe in Baptiſme, though thereby never ſo many Brethren ſtumble, or are offended, or made weake.

The unreaſonableneſſe of this aſſertion *Ames* in his reply to *Morton* hath proved by many arguments, That are as yet unanſwered, which I ſhall here tranſcribe.

A ſcandall in the nature of it is ſpirituall murder: Now ſuppoſe a ſuperiour ſhould command a thing in it ſelfe indifferent, whereupon murder were like to follow; as to runne a horſe, or a cart, in a certaine way, at a certaine time, when it may be unwitting to the commander, little children were playing in the way, would any mans conſcience ſerve him to doe it?

Avoiding of ſcandall is a maine duty of Charity: May Superiours at their pleaſure appoint how farre I ſhall ſhew my Charity towards my brothers ſoule? Then ſurely an inferiour earthly court may croſſe the determinations of the high court of heaven.

The ſuperiours have no power given them for deſtruction, but onely for edification: If therefore they command ſcandals, they goe beyond their Commiſſion: neither are we tied therein to doe as they bid, but as they ſhould bid.

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If determination by ſuperiours were ſufficient to take away the ſinne of a ſcandall. Then they doe very ill that they do not (ſo farre as is poſſible) determine all things indifferent, that ſo no danger may be left in giving of offence by the uſe of them. Then the Church of Rome is to be praiſed, in that ſhe hath determined of ſo many indifferents: then Paul *with the other Apoſtles might have ſpared a great deale of labour in admoniſhing the Churches how they ſhould avoid offences about ſome indifferent things: A farre ſhorter way had been either to determine the matter fully: or elſe to have given order, that the Churches ſhould among themſelves determine it at home.*

But ſay that the Archbiſhop of Corinth (for now I ſuppoſe ſuch a one) had called his convocation, and with conſent of his Clergie had determined, that men might, and for teſtifying of liberty ſhould, at a certaine time eat of ſuch and ſuch meats, which men formerly doubted of: would not yet the Apoſtle have given the ſame direction he did? Would not good Chriſtians ſtill have had care of their brothers conſciences? Can the determination of a ſuperiour be a ſufficient plea at the barre of Gods judgment ſeat, for a man that by virtue or force thereof alone, hath done any action, that his conſcience telleth him, will ſcandalize his brother.

Laſtly, I would faine know whether thoſe ſuperiours do not give a great ſcandall, which take upon them determinately to impoſe unneceſſary rites, which they know many good men will be ſcandalized by? Thus farre *Ames.* But this opinion of *Ames,* is I confeſſe to be underſtood *cum gravo ſalis,* with many limitations, which I ſhall lay downe fully in the Tractate that next followeth.

If the Prelates would have ſeriouſly laid to heart that golden ſaying of *Paul* (1 Cor. 8. 13. *If meate make my brother to offend, I will eat no fleſh, while the world ſtandeth, leſt I make my brother to offend*) This would ſuperſede all further diſpute of this argument: for thence it is eaſie to evict, that it is unlawfull for Church governours to command the obſervation of things indifferent, when in all probability they will ſcandalize: how dare they make that the matter of a Church Canon, which *Paul* durſt not adventure upon in his own perſonall practice? He thought it unlawfull to do a thing otherwiſe indifferent, to eat fleſh in the caſe of ſcandall, and therefore doubtleſſe he judged it unlawfull in ſuch a caſe to impoſe any ſuch matter upon others: Greater was the importance

tance of the fleſh forborne by *Paul* unto his health, and the comfort of his life; then the profit of the controverted ceremonies can be unto the worſhip and ſervice of God: And beſides, the indifferency of eating fleſh was a thing cleare, and evident unto all, that were well inſtructed in the Doctrine of Chriſtian liberty; whereas the indifferency of our ceremonies will at leaſt be judged a very doubtfull matter, and that by very indifferent men, who ſhall thoroughly ponder the Arguments of *Didoclave*, *Parker*, *Ames* and others againſt them, which to this day remaine unanſwered. The Prelates will not pretend unto ſuch an ample authority in the Church of God, as *Paul* had: But though they be farre inferiour unto him in point of Authority, they are not yet ſo humble, as to imitate him in the condeſcention of his charity. *Pauls* peremptorie reſolve was to forbeare a thing indifferent, whē it ſcandalized. *If meate make my brother to offend, I will* (ſaith he) *eat no fleſh, while the world ſtandeth, leaſt I make my brother to offend*, 1 Cor. 8. 13.

But what a wide difference, nay contrariety was there betwixt this charitable reſolution of *Paul*, and the rigid practiſe of the Prelates. For they were obſtinately bent to preſſe the Ceremonies, with all ſeverity, without any care, or Conſcience of the ſcandals enſuing: nay their endeavour was daily to adde unto the heape of former ceremonies, though they knew that thereby the ſcandals would be increaſed: They ſpake a language quite contrary to that of *Paul*: we will enjoyne (ſay they) the ſurplice, croſſe, kneeling in the ſacrament of the Lords ſupper, while the world ſtandeth, as long as we have any power, and authority in the Church of God, Let who will be offended: This their rigour brings unto my mind a cruel command of (*l*) *Vedius Pollio*, that was countermanded by *Auguſtus Cæſar* ſupping with him: A

(*l*) Cum *Auguſtus* cœnaret apud Vedium Pollionem. Fregerat unus ex ſervis ejus cryſtallinum: rapi eum Vedius juſſit, nec vulgari quidem periturum morte murænis objici jubebatur, quas ingens piſcina continebat. Quis non hoc illum putaret luxuriæ cauſa facere? ſævitia erat: evaſit è manibus puer, & confugit ad Cæſaris pedes: nihil aliud petiturus, quam ut aliter periret, nec eſca fieret. Motus eſt novitate crudelitatis Cæſar, & illum quidem mitti, cryſtallina autem omnia coram ſe frangi juſſit, complerique piſcinam. Fuit Cæſari ſic caſtigandus amicus: bene uſus eſt viribus ſuis. E convivio rapi homines imperas, & novi generis pœnis lancinari? ſi calix tuus fractus eſt, viſcera hominis diſtrahentur? tantum tibi placebis &c. Seneca de ira. Lib. 3.

poore

poore boy his slave had casually broken a Chrystall glasse, and for this *Pollio* most inhumanely condemned him to be throwne into a great pond of Lampreys, there to be devoured. The boy escaping from those appointed for his execution, prostrated himselfe at the feet of Cæsar, who then sup't with his master, and desired not pardon, but onely commutation of so horrid and unnaturall a death: *Augustus was extreamly* transported with the strangenesse and novelty of so inhumane a cruelty, and hereupon to prevent the like for the future he forthwith commanded all the Christall glasses of *Pollio*, though his friend, to be broken, and the fishpond to be filled up: for the breaking of a sorry glasse he thought it a disproportioned and too severe a punishment, to have a mans bowels pluck't in pieces, and torne asunder. This spirit of *Vedius* Pollio breathed in many of our late Prelates; The Ceremonies in comparison of mens soules were but as paltry trifles, as glasses, and feathers: and yet, by the maintenance of them, they hazarded the soules of thousands (In as much as in them lay) *they destroyed the worke of God, they destroyed those for whom Christ died*; they scandalize Papists, and separatists: people and Pastours: conformists, and non-conformists, as Mr *Parker* at large demonstrates: Dr *John Burgesse* (as I have often heard) urged this story in a Sermon before King *James* to perswade him unto the abolition of the Ceremonies: And King *James* had doubtlesse expressed a Christian, and royall care of his people, if he had broken these glasses in pieces: if he had cashered these toyes out of the Church, which had broken so many in their estates, wounded so many in their consciences, and endangered the salvation of so many soules: and hereby have prevented those unspeakable griefes, feares, and scandalls, which they formerly occasioned.

I proceed unto the third and last conclusion, which is, that *no deliberate actions* of men, which proceeds from *deliberate reason*, if they be considered in *actu exercito*, in the singular or particular, *as cloathed with circumstances, are indifferent*, but all of them are morally either good, or evill.

For the better understanding of this Conclusion, I shall out of

(*m*) *Ames* adde *two limitations* of it.

1. Then, this concluſion is to be underſtood only of an *adequate conſideration of the circumſtances* of ſingular actions, for not onely one, but more circumſtances of a humane action in the individuall may be indifferent: In a conference of ſchollers it is many times indifferent, whether they diſcourſe in latine, or Engliſh, whether in the morning, or afternoone: But yet their whole conference conſidered *adequately* with all circumſtances is either good, or evill; And the reaſon is becauſe the determination of an action doth not depend upon one circumſtance apart, but upon all joyntly.

(*m*) Circumſtantia una aut altera actionis alicujus humanæ poteſt eſſe indifferens, ut ſi ſtudioſus unus cum alioſermonem conferat, indifferens eſt, ſæpenumero, utrum vernaculo utaturſermone, an Latino: ſed ſermo ipſe, cum omnibus ſuis circumſtantiis, vel bonus eſt, vel malus. Ratio eſt, quia determinatio actionis non pendet ab una circumſtantia ſeorſim, ſed ab omnibus conjunctim.

A *ſecond limitation* of the concluſion is that it is not *to be extended unto every comparative conſideration of humane actions and their circumſtances*: I know, that not onely actions indifferent, but alſo thoſe that are commanded become ſometime to be ſinfull by *compariſon*, when they are preferred to better actions. God diſlikes thoſe recreations, that otherwiſe he alloweth, when they juſtle out duties: nay he abhorreth ſacrifice, when it is inconſiſtent with mercy: but notwithſtanding this, when there is an equality, if not of actions themſelves, yet of their morall motives as to *hic*, and *nunc* this preſent time and place, Then curiouſly to compare and ballance ſuch actions, were needleſſe: for in ſuch a caſe, the prelation of one before the other, would be a thing meerly arbitrary, neither good nor bad: Reading, prayer, meditation are things commanded: but many times that I ſet apart ſuch an houre for reading principally may be a thing indifferent: that I make choice of one Recreation before another, of bowling before Cheſſe, draughts, &c. that I chooſe to walke in the forenoon, ra-

Datur actio aliqua ſingularis, in qua nulla bonitatis ratio reperitur, quæ inalia non poſſit inveniri: atque adeo quod hoc tempore, hoc vel illud potius agimus quam aliud, in eo ſæpe nihil boni aut mali occurrit. Opportunitas, aut animi ſuggeſtio, ſine ullo reſpectu bonitatis moralis, ſatis habet ponderis ad ſingularem iſtam determinationem.

Quamvis igitur nulla ſingularis actio humana ſit, quæ neque eſt bona neque mala, fiunt tamen variæ, quæ ſingulariter & in comparatione ad alias, neque ſunt neceſſariæ, neque illicitæ. Sicut enim ſtatuarius certam rationem ſæpe non habet, cur iſtam potius quam aliam ſtatuam facit, ſi tamen aliquam faciat, neceſſe eſt, ut vel regulas artis ſequendo bonam faciat, aut aberrando malam, ſic eſt in multis actionibus hominum ſingularibus, quæ quoad exercitium nullam habent rationem propriam, præter inclinationem animi, ſed cum exercentur vel bonæ ſunt, vel malæ. De caſ. conſ. Lib. 3. cap. 18.

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ther then in the afternoon; may be of no morall consideration, and so neither good, nor evill, but a matter of indifferency. Looke as an Image carver may have no peculiar reason to make this Image, rather then that; yet if he make any Image at all; either he followeth the rules of his art, and then he makes a good Image; or he swarves from those rules, and then he makes a bad image, and doth not worke like an Artist: So many times it may be to a Christian, a matter meerly indifferent to performe this or that action, he may have no obligation to doe either, or at least to doe one rather then the other, but may be left unto his own mind, and pleasure: but yet he is as a Christian obliged to regard such circumstances in all his actions, and therefore whatsoever he doth, he doth it either well, or ill; for either he observeth these circumstances, and then his action is good, or he neglects them, and then it is bad.

The conclusion being thus explained may be made apparent *from the end, and rule of deliberate actions.*

1. *From their end,* and what ought to be the end of all deliberate actions of man may be evidenced from their *relation unto their Originall,* from *a consideration of them absolutely as they are in themselves.*

1. *From their relation unto their Originall,* the rationall soule, or the soule, as rationall, they flow from man, as man, they proceed from his deliberate reason, and therefore, should have the same end, which man as rationall should propound, the glorifying of his maker; If they have not this end, they are evill: and if they have this end, why then (if there be no fayling otherwise) they are good. This argument is by *(m) Raynaudus* thus urged:

(m) Quærenda igitur sunt firmiora præsidia, sententiæ humanos actus indifferentes inficiantis. Unum duco ex operatione humana prout est germen naturæ rationalis. Homo enim ad suas operationes habet se veluti arbor ad fructus, ut optimè advertit Antonius l. 9. de vita sua, num. 8. & pulchrè Guliel. Par lib. de virtut. ca. 12. initio: cum ea tamen differentia, ut scitè notavit Antonius l. 11. num. 1. quod arborum & quarumvis plantarum fructus, alii percipiunt: ipse homo fructus sui percipit, nec alii, sed sibi ipsi laborat. Cum igitur operatio humana se habeat ad naturam rationalem, sicut fructus & germen ejus, necesse est, ut idem sit finis operationis ab humana natura prodeuntis, & ipsius naturæ rationalis. Sic enim videmus, servata proportione, accidere in omnibus aliis naturis. Et ratio est, quia cùm natura sit actus quidam primus, actio verò sit actus ejus secundus, qui est ipsamet tendentia actus primi in objectum, & finem suum; necessarium profecto videtur, ut idemmet sit finis ultimus actionis & naturæ actionem principiantis: sicut trunci & germinum & totius arboris, ac fructuum, idem est finis. Debet ergo humanæ naturæ & actionis humanæ esse idem finis. Atqui finis ultimus humanæ naturæ est Deus: Ergo finis quoque ultimus actionis nostræ debet esse Deus. Constat autem, actum indifferentem, si daretur, non habiturum pro fine Deum: nam sic non esset indifferens, sed revera bonus. Ergo careret aliquo, quod habere deberet, nempe relatione illa ad finem ultimum naturæ humanæ; ac proinde esset malus moraliter, non autem indifferens. Moral. disciplin: dist. 4. q. 1. art. 2. n. 37

man is related unto his operations, as a tree unto it's fruits and branches: and therefore there is the ſame end of the humane operations, and the humane nature, and the reaſon is, becauſe that nature is the firſt act, and it's operation the ſecond act which is a tendencie of the firſt act towards it's object, and end; and therefore it ſeemes neceſſary, that there ſhould be the ſame uttermoſt end of the nature, and the operation; Even as there is the ſame end of the tree, it's ſtock, branches, and fruits: But now the uttermoſt end of the humane nature is God: and therefore God ſhould be the uttermoſt end of every humane action, and conſequently no humane action can be indifferent: for if it have not God for it's end, it is ſinfull: becauſe it wants that relation unto the uttermoſt end of the humane nature, which it ought to have: and if it have God for it's end, then it is morally good, if it want not any other eſſentiall requiſite.

(n) Alterum ſententiæ noſtræ firmamentum profero ex actu humano per ſeipſum conſiderato. Hoc eſt non quatenus eſt germen naturæ, & quatenus eundem cum ea finem ultimum habere

2. *From a conſideration of them* (n) *abſolutely* as they are in themſelves: Every humane rationall action is referred unto ſome chiefe end or other, and that muſt be, either the creature, or the creatour: If it be the creature, then the creature is moſt ſinfully injoyed, as mans ſupreme end, and higheſt happineſſe: whereas it ſhould be only uſed, as a means: and hereby it is at leaſt *virtually*, and *interpretatively* idolized, deified, and placed in the roome of God: If it be the Creator then the action is good, unleſſe it be in ſome other regard defective. And ſo you ſee that

debet, ſed ſolitariè, perinde ac ſi non eſſet fructus illius naturæ. Sic igitur argumentor. Actio humana vel ultimo refertur ad Deum, ſive actu, ſive virtualiter, & ſuapte natura, quatenus eſt rationi conformis, & ſic eſt bona: vel nullo modo in Deum tendit: & ſic eo ipſo deflectit ab eo fine, eſtque mala moraliter. Nam eo ipſo quod non ſit ob finem increatum, nec in eum tendit ſaltem virtualiter, ſicut faciunt omnes boni actus, ſiſtit omnino in bono creato, eſtque ejus fruitio. Perverſum autem eſt, frui utendis, ut latè tradit D. Auguſtinus 1. de Doct. Chriſt. à cap. 3. &c. 21. & 22. oſtendens omnia bona creata debere tantum cadere ſub uſum noſtrum, ſub fruitionem autem non niſi Deum. Ergo Actus humani carentes bono fine, vel intrinſeco, vel extrinſeco, ſunt eo ipſo depravati, carentque aliquo quod habere deberent. Eſt enim in omni actione creatâ, debitum, ut ſit fruitio fruendorum: id eſt, ut ultimò ad Deum tendat aliquo modo. Nam ſi non haberet hoc ex debito, poſſet eſſe fruitio utendorum, nihilque idcirco haberet indebitum. Quia igitur actus humanus, qui dicitur fore prorſus indifferens, eſſet fruitio puri boni creati, quod utendum fuiſſet non fruendum, merito convincitur non fuiſſe indifferens, ſed oblitus cœno turpitudinis moralis, ob defectum volitionis ad finem debitam. n. 38. loc. prædict.

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unto what ſoever end it be referred, either created, or uncreated, it cannot be indifferent.

For the further enforcement of this reaſon, I ſhall alleadge, and open ſome few ſcriptures.

The firſt is Matth. 12. 36. *But I ſay unto you, that every idle word that men ſhall ſpeake, they ſhall give account thereof in the day of judgment.* Three things here merit our conſideration. 1. *What is meant by an idle word.* 2. *What by giving account thereof:* and 3dly, *How this makes againſt the indifferency of humane actions, conſidered in their ſingulars, and actuall exiſtence.*

1. *What is meant by an idle word:* that which hath no obliquity in it but this, that it wants a good and honeſt end: That it is unprofitable, and unfruitfull, both unto ſpeaker, and hearer: *quod aut utilitate rectitudinis aut ratione juſtæ neceſſitatis caret, as Gregory, Homily.* 6. As for thoſe, who think, that an idle word is extended unto every word, groſſely wicked, falſe, lying, blaſphemous, the very context will diſprove them: The occaſion of our Saviours diſcourſe was that blaſphemy of the Phariſees, *verſ.* 24. *But when the Phariſees heard it, they ſaid, this fellow doth not caſt out Devils, but by Beelzebub, the prince of the Devils:* Now our Saviours drift is to diſcover the ſinfulneſſe, and danger of this blaſphemous ſpeech of theirs: And this he doth, as by ſeverall arguments, ſo particularly, in this verſe, by arguing *a minori ad majus*, from the leſſe to the greater: As if he ſhould have ſaid: *If in the day of judgment ye ſhall give an account for every idle word,* then much more for ſuch a blaſphemous vomit as this of yours, *That I caſt out Devils by the aſſiſtance of Beelzebub:* That our Saviours Argument here ſtands thus *Maldonate* tels us, all are of that opinion that he ever read. And for this coherence take theſe *two Reaſons.*

1. Our Saviour proceeds in *a way of aggravating* the now mentioned Blaſphemy: But if by every idle word you underſtand every groſſely wicked, and blaſphemous word, there will be little aggravation hereof: for to ſay that every wicked lying, blaſphemous word, that men ſhall ſpeake, they ſhall give account thereof in the day of judgment, falls very ſhort of what was ſpoken allready of this blaſphemy *verſ.* 31. 32. That it was a *blaſphemy againſt the Holy Ghoſt, and not to be forgiven, either in this world, or in the world to come.*

2. *Compare* we theſe words with thoſe immediately foregoing *verſ.* 35. *A good man out of the good treaſure of the heart, bringeth forth good things: and an evill man out of the evill treaſure, bringeth forth evill things*: In the latter part of theſe words, *by evill things* are underſtood ſuch evill words as were notoriouſly ſuch, ſuch as even the Phariſees acknowledged to be ſo; The *Idle words* then in *verſ.* 36. are diſtinguiſhed from them, as may very probably be gathered from the Antitheſis inſinuated in the particle [but] *But I ſay unto you every idle word, that men ſhall ſpeake, they ſhall give account thereof in the day of Judgment:* It is apparent, that our Saviour ſpake of ſuch words, whoſe ſinfulneſſe ſeemed ſtrange, and new unto ſuch looſe commentators on the Law, as the Phariſees were: And it is very obſervable, that he uſhereth in this his commination againſt every idle word with the very ſame forme of ſpeech, that he uſeth (*chapt.* 5. *verſ.* 12,28,31,34,39,44.) In his correction of their corrupt gloſſes upon the law of God. So then our Saviour ſpeakes of that, which founded as very harſh and rigid doctrine in the eares of the Phariſees: *But I ſay unto you that every idle word, that men ſhall ſpeak they ſhall give an account thereof in the day of Judgment*: Notwithſtanding your ſlighting thoughts of your vaine, and unprofitable diſcourſe, I, who am the truth, and know fully the mind of God, as being alwaies in his boſome, doe aſſure you, that every idle word, which men ſhall ſpeak, every word, which is not referred unto a good end, they ſhall give an account thereof in the day of Judgment.

2. Enquire we, *what it is to give an account of every idle word in the day of Judgment.* The phraſe ſometimes ſignifies onely *triall, and examination, Luk.* 16.2. *Heb.*13.17: But that here it importeth condemnation, and puniſhment, (*n*) *Suarez* proveth from the ſcope of the words which was to terrifie the Phariſees for their blaſphemy, and to deterre others from the like, by diſ-

(*n*) Illa verba dixit ad incutiendum hominibus timorem, & ex aggerandam ſeveritatem divini judicii: ergo ſenſus illorum verborum eſt ita homines reddituros rationem otioſi verbi, ut ſi nullam aliam excuſationem, vel rationabilem cauſam habeant, pro illo puniendi ſunt alioquin verba Chriſti nullum fere pondus aut energiam haberent, neque aliquem metum inferent, cum tamen illo ſingulari exemplo voluerit Chriſtus oſtendere, quam ſint graviter puniendi homines: pro verbis pravioribus. De bonitate & malit. humanorum act: diſp. 9. Sect. 3.

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playing, and amplifying the ſeverity of Gods judgment againſt it: And unto this the threatning of puniſhment and condemnation for every idle word is more conducing, then a propoſall of a bare tryall and examination of every idle word, which is agreeable unto the beſt words and works of men: *becauſe for them they may give an account with joy*, *Heb.*13.17. In the words then, there is plainly *a Metalepſis*, the *Antecedent*, to give an account in the day of Judgment is put for the *conſequent* to be puniſhed in hell-fire, *Every idle word that men ſhall ſpeak, they ſhall give an account thereof in the day of Judgment*: that is they without repentance ſhall be condemned, and everlaſtingly puniſhed for it: And this acception of the phraſe we find elſewhere, as 1*Pet.*4.5.

I paſſe on unto the *third* particular *how this makes againſt the indifferency of humane actions* conſidered in their ſingular and actuall exiſtence: I *anſwere*: becauſe it concludes againſt *the indifferency* of any words of men; for thoſe words, which in the generall, and in their own nature are indifferent: yet as drawn into exerciſe, and putting on circumſtances they are idle, if they have no goodneſſe adjoyned unto them, by reference unto their due, and requiſite ends: And if they be idle they are ſinfull, and conſequently not indifferent: And what is ſaid of idle words of men is applyable unto the idle thoughts, and workes of men: for the thought of man is a more rationall act then his ſpeech, more an act of reaſon: And his rationall works proceed from his thoughts, and are of farre greater moment and importance then his words: and ſo in the upſhot we may inferre that if mens idle words are not indifferent, then neither mens idle thoughts, and works: And the juſtneſſe of this inference, I ſhall confirme by two arguments.

1. Idle words are therefore ſinfull, becauſe (being the birth and product of reaſon, and the free will of man) *there is not in them propounded an end ſuitable unto the reaſonable nature of man*: Now all the vaine thoughts, and idle works of men are the iſſue of reaſon, and freedome of will: and therefore, (becauſe they are not referred unto ſuch an honeſt end, as becomes the dignity of ſuch a rationall creature, as man,) they are fanltie and vitious.

2. Idle words are therefore morally evill: becauſe in them, *that precious treaſure, time, is waſted*, in which a man may be more laviſh,

laviſh, then in the moſt prodigall miſpence of money: But now our time is vainly conſumed to no good end, and purpoſe, in our idle thoughts, and works: and therefore they are ſinfull, as well as our idle words: and conſequently not indifferent.

A ſecond place is, 1*Cor.* 10. 31. *Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatſoever ye doe, do all unto the Glory of God:* To eat, and to drinke *abſtractively conſidered*, are indifferent actions, and yet ſuch actions are here commanded to be referred unto the glory of God: and therefore if they be not thus referred, they are ſinfull: And we may ſay the ſame of all other actions, that are *in ſpecie*, in their own nature indifferent. *Capreolus* (lib. 2. diſt. 40. quæſt 1. pag. 562.) noteth, that theſe words of the Apoſtle [*Let all things be done unto the Glory of God*] may be underſtood two manner of waies *negatively or affirmatively.*

1. *Negatively*, and then the ſenſe is, do nothing againſt Gods glory, nothing that may diſhonour him: Things offered unto idols were in themſelves the good creatures of God, and to eate them an action in it ſelfe indifferent, but to eate them in the Idols Temple was to countenance Idolatry, and ſo a high diſhonouring of God, To eat them alſo with the ſcandall of a weake brother, was to prejudice, and *obſtruct the* glorifying of Gods name.

2dly, The words may be underſtood *affirmatively*, and ſo there is (as *Capreolus* obſerveth) a threefold reference unto the glory of God.

1. *Habituall.*
2. *Actuall.*
3. *Virtuall.*

1. *An habituall reference* there is unto the glory of God, whereſoever there is the habit, the grace, or vertue of the love of God, the principle of actually referring all things unto the glory of God. But now *this is not ſufficient*: for the habit of love may (for a long time) lie idle, and un-active, and be conſiſtent with very groſſe ſins: as we ſee in *David*, *Peter*, and others.

2. An action is *actually referred* unto Gods glory, when there is an actuall cogitation of God, and his glory: And this, (though it ought frequently to be done) is not yet required in every action: well it may be our happineſſe in the next life; But it can not be our

our duty in this; becauſe it would leave no roome, or place for other duties: Thus for an Artiſt to be alwaies thinking upon the rules of his Art, would be a diſturbance unto his worke: for a traveller to have perpetually in his thoughts, the end of his journey would retard his progreſſe therein.

In a *third* place therefore, the reference of all our actions unto Gods glory, that is here exhorted to, is onely *virtuall*. And that an action may virtually be referred unto Gods glory *three things* are required. 1. The above mentioned *habituall reference* unto Gods glory muſt be preſuppoſed, as alſo. 2dly, A foregoing *actuall reference of a mans ſelfe, and all that belongs unto him* unto the glory of God, and the more frequent this is, the better, and 3ly, *The Action* it ſelfe. 1. *Muſt not be referred unto any end oppoſite* unto Gods glory. 2. *It muſt be referred unto ſome end ſubordinate* unto Gods glory, that carrieth a tendency unto it, and is naturally referrible thereunto.

Now ſuch an action is ſaid to be *virtually* referred unto Gods glory, becauſe it is done in the virtue, and force of ſome preceding *actuall, and explicite* propoſall of Gods glory as a ſupreame end: for the virtue, and force of the chiefe, and utmoſt end abideth in all inferiour ends ſubordinated unto it; ſo that he, who propounds unto himſelfe thoſe inferiour ends, may be ſaid to propound *implicitly*, and *mediately* Gods glory for his uttermoſt end. Thus thoſe godly perſons who have firſt actually made Gods honour and glory, the maine ayme of their deſires, endeavours, and undertakings, may be ſaid afterwards to referre even their eating, and drinking, their recreations unto Gods glory *virtually*, if they ayme at no diſhoneſt end, though their explicit and immediate intendment be onely the refreſhment of their bodies, by which they are the better fitted, and prepared for the glorifying of God in both their generall, and particular callings. Thus every ſtep in a mans journey, (ſo he goe not out of the way) may be ſaid to be *virtually* deſigned unto the end of his journey, and yet it is neither neceſſary, nor expedient, that in every ſtep a man ſhould have actuall thoughts of the end of his journey.

Unto this ſentence of the Apoſtle here, *Eſtius* makes Parallel two other places.

The first, Col. 3. 17. *Whatsoever ye doe in word or deed, doe all in the name of the Lord Jesus*, that is, for his glory and honour, for his names sake.

The second is, 1 Pet. 4. 11. *If any man speake, let him speake as the Oracles of God: If any man minister, let him doe it as of the ability, which God giveth, that God in all things may be glorified through Jesus Christ*; Not onely in publick ordinances, not onely in acts of worship, not onely in necessary duties, but even in indifferencies, in all the common actions of this life.

But as for any further exposition of these *two* places in themselves, or application unto the matter in hand, I shall referre the reader unto what I but now spake on the 1 *Cor.* 10. 31. which with due change will serve here.

I shall therefore passe on unto a *second argument taken from the rule of humane actions*, *right reason*: Unto this rule all rationall actions, proceeding from deliberate reason, are either *agreeable*, or *disagreeable*: If *agreeable*, then they are morally good; for right reason is a part of Scripture *materially* considered: If *disagreeable*, then they are vitious and sinfull; For the will of man is bound to looke to it's rule, and conforme all it's actions thereunto: and therefore if in any thing it neglect, or thwart it, if it *swarve* therefrom in the least particulars, it thereby commits a sinne.

Unto these two arguments I shall adde *a third, drawn from the relation betwixt morall goodnesse and illnesse*: They are privatively opposite; *and inter privative opposita non datur medium in proprio subjecto susceptivo*; betwixt things privatively opposite there is no middle, either of *abnegation*, or *participation* in capable subjects: Thus every sensitive creature either seeth, or is blind: but we cannot say of a stone, that it is blind, although it seeth not; because it is not capable of sight: Now morall goodnesse and illnesse are privatively opposed, (the formality of sinne being nothing else, but a privation of that morall goodnesse, which is required unto every rationall action;) Now every rationall action, Every action, that proceeds from deliberate reason, and freedome of will, considered in its singulars, and as drawn into exercise is capable of morall goodnesse; because it is referrible unto a good end: and therefore it is either good, or evill, and so not indifferent.

Against

Againſt this there are divers objections: unto thoſe of *Scotus* the reader may ſupply himſelfe with anſwers out of what hath been ſaid already: As for the arguments of *Vaſquez*, there is but (*o*) one of them merit's any examination, and yet that hath been alſo anſwered out of *Durand.* (*b*)

In brieſe, it run's thus. As no *Genus*, no *generall* nature can be without one ſpecies, ſo no *ſpecies*, no *ſpeciall* without one ſingular. No ſpecificall nature but hath at leaſt one individuall: and therefore, if there be ſome humane actions, that be in their ſpecies, in their ſpecificall nature indifferent, there muſt needs be an individuall of ſuch an action, that muſt be indifferent: and conſequently all humane actions conſidered in the individuall are not morally good, or evill.

This hath been ſufficiently anſwered allready; but now I ſhall, *ex abundanti*, adde two things more.

The firſt is out of (*p*) *Raynaudus*: An humane action that conſidered ſpecifically is indifferent, in regard of object or matter may in it's individuals and ſingulars be lookt upon *two manner of waies.* 1. *Inadequately* only as touching matter, or object. 2. *Adequately* in regard of all circumſtances.

1. If an humane action be conſidered ſpecifically indifferent

(*o*) Prima ratio eſt deſumpta ex eo, quod Doctores prioris opinionis concedunt, eſſe nimirum actionem indifferentem ex ſuâ ſpecie, & objecto, tametſi in individuo nulla maneat indifferens. Ratio vero eſt huſmodi. Nulla eſt natura in ſpecie, quæ non habeat aliquod individuum in quo ratio ejus maneat, & non deſtruatur per contrariam: cum igitur ſit actio humana indifferens ſecundum ſuam naturam & ſpeciem, habere debet aliquod individuum, ac proinde eſſe poterit aliqua actio individua, & ſingularis, quæ maneat indifferens. In 12æ tom. diſp. 52. cap. 4. pag. 378.

(*p*) Hunc loquendi modum, fateor eſſe cavillo obnoxium; impugnaturque ab Argentina in 2. d. 40 qu. unica. art. 2. in 2. particuli: quia nulla poteſt eſſe ſpecies cujus non poſſit eſse aliquid individuum. Ergo ſi dantur actus ſecundum ſpeciem indifferentes, debent quoque dari indifferentes ſecundum individuum. Quod argumentum agendo de ſpecie, & individuo in ſenſu quotidiano, & vulgari, rectè concludit, ſed non contra eos, qui admittunt actus ſecundum ſpeciem indifferentes, negant autem dari indifferentes in individuo. Nam hi Autores fatentur illos ipſos actus, quos admittunt, eſse ſecundum peciem indifferentes, habere quoque indifferentiam quoad gradum illorum ſpecificum reſtrictum per individuationem. Tantum itaque negant, eos actus, ſi ſpectentur cum omnibus ſibi debitis accidentibus, eſse moraliter indifferentes. Et hoc appellant, actus non eſſe indifferentes ſecundum individuum: nempe quia individuum, ſecluſo rigore illo Metaphyſico, in quo tantùm importat reſtrictionem gradus ſpecifici, involvit congeriem omnium horum accidentium, aut ut paſſim loquimur, conditionum individuantium, ſecundum quam congeriem actus humanus non eſt indifferens, quatenus vel inter illa accidentia eſt debitus finis extrinſecus, & ſic actus eſt bonus: vel non eſt debitus finis, & ſic eſt malus, Mor. diſc. diſtin. 4. qu. 1. art. 2. Num. 31.

as *touching matter or object*, then all the individuals or ſingulars of that action are indifferent too, *not ſimply and abſolutely, but ſecundum quid*; that is only as touching their object, and matter: But notwithſtanding this, if we conſider them *adequately* in reſpect of all circumſtances, they are either good, or evill: for either they are cloathed with all circumſtances required in a rationall action, and then they are good: or elſe they want ſome, or one of theſe circumſtances, and then they are evill and ſinfull, for *malum ſit ex quovis defectu*.

(q) Reſpondeo, poſſe aliquid eſſe indifferens dupliciter. 1. Quod indifferentia ſit de ejus eſſentiâ. 2. Quod ipſi conveniat per accidens, & ab extrinſeco. Si ſit indifferens priori modo, neceſſe in inferioribus ſalvari iſtam indifferentiam, quia tota eſſentia ſuperioris reperitur in inferiori, ſiquidem eſſentia conſiſtit in indiviſibili: ſi ſit indifferens poſteriori modo, non eſt neceſſe ſalvari indifferentiam in inferiori: nam quæ per accidens ſuperiori conveniunt, ſunt ab ipſo ſeparabilia: ergo ſine illis poteſt communicari inferiori. Si talia accidentia repugnent inferiori. V. C. poſſe prædicari de multis numero differentibus, convenit naturæ humanæ ſecundum ſpeciem conſideratæ, ſed per accidens, & ab extrinſeco, ſcilicet per operationem mentis eam abſtrahentibus à ſingularibus, & cum illis ipſam conferentis; talis autem operatio eſt merè contingens tali naturæ. Ex oppoſito, eſſe animal rationale convenit eidem humanæ naturæ tanquam illius eſſentia. Ex quo fit, ut humana natura nequeat communicari inferioribus, quin ipſis tribuat hoc animal rationale, ſed non ipſis communicat poſſe de multis numero prædicari, alioqui quodlibet individuum eſſet ſpecies. Jam ut ad propoſitum veniam, Indifferentia actui ſecundum ſpeciem conceſſa non eſt ipſi eſſentialis, ſed accidentalis per abſtractionem ab individuiſſimo non eſt indifferentia moralis poſitiva: quaſi actus ille ſit moralis, & indifferens: ſed eſt moralis negativa, quatenus actus ille non eſt moralis, ſed caret ordine ad rationem morum regulam, ideoque nec bonus eſt, nec malus moraliter. Unde patet non debere in ullo individuo ſalvari talem indifferentiam, niſi fortè in actibus indeliberatis, qui ſimiliter non ſint morales; ſed ipſi abſunt à noſtrâ quæſtione. Ethic. cap. 3. Sect. 2.

The *ſecond* is out of a moderne *Thomiſt*, (q) *Irenæus*. A thing may be ſaid to be indifferent two manner of waies. 1. *When indifferency is eſſentiall unto it*. 2. *When indifferency agreeth unto it onely by accident*, and *extrinſecally*, from ſomething that is extraeſſentiall unto it: If indifferency were eſſentiall unto an humane action, conſidered ſpecifically, then every ſingular, or individuall thereof muſt be indifferent too; becauſe the eſſentials of every thing ſuperiour in point of predication are imparted, and attributed unto every thing, that is under them in point of predication; as every individuall of the humane nature is a ſenſitive creature, a living body, &c. But now indifferency is aſcribed unto ſome humane actions (conſidered ſpecifically) onely *by accident*, *and extrinſecally*, from the operation of our underſtandings, abſtracting, and deveſting them from thoſe circumſtances good, or bad, wherewith in their individualls they are apparel'd: and therefore agre-

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eth not unto their individuals look't upon without ſuch an abſtraction.

By what hath been ſaid, you ſee that our moſt indifferent actions are liable unto ſinne; and therefore afford matter of *humiliation* for the time paſt, matter of *Caution* for the future. *Application.*

1. *Matter of humiliation for the time paſt*: In their ſingular, and actuall exiſtence they were morally either good or evill, ſanctified or ſinnefull; and good they could not be, unleſſe there did concurre all requiſites: And (alas,) how ſeldome hath there occurred in them ſuch a concurrence? ſometimes they have riſen from a wrong principle; other times they have been directed unto bad ends; moſt times they have been faulty in regard of either meaſure, or manner: It is very ſeldome, but there hath been wanting in them ſome circumſtance, or other, that the word of God, or law of nature requireth: And the *totall* want of one of the leaſt of ſuch circumſtances will ſo vitiate indifferent actions, as that it will not onely render them ſinfull, but make them ſinnes, meritorious of all the flames, and torments in hell: and that which deſerves ſo ſevere a puniſhment, calls for a very eminent ſorrow and contrition: God hath ſet bounds unto the uſe of our liberty in things indifferent, (as unto the waves of the ſea,) ſaying, thus farre ſhall ye goe, and no farther: He hath commanded, that it ſhould be reſtrained by *prudence, Temperance, conſcience, Religion, Authority, and charity*; But we have tranſgreſſed theſe limits, and have exceeded all bounds of moderation: We have uſed this part of our Chriſtian liberty very imprudently, and intemperately in regard of our ſelves; irreligiouſly, and profanely in reſpect of God: againſt the dictates of our conſcience, a deputy under him; againſt the obligations of our oathes, and vowes unto him: diſobediently againſt the lawfull commands of our ſuperiours: uncharitably with the ſcandall of many poore brethren. And thus have we moſt ſhamefully, and unthankfully abuſed this great priviledg of Chriſtianity, by uſing it as an *occaſion unto the fleſh*, as a *cloake of malicioufneſſe*; and ſo have proſtituted it unto the very ſervice of Satan himſelfe: *When* Job's *Sons and Daughters had feaſted together*, Job *offered burnt offerings according unto the number of them all: for he ſaid, it may be that my ſonnes have ſinned*, *Job.* 1. 4. 5. Their feaſting was a thing indifferent, and very lawfull

in it ſelfe: but, becauſe it was obnoxious unto ſinne, therefore *Jobe* ſacrificed in the behalfe of them all: It may be (ſaith he) *that my ſonnes have ſinned:* The *poſſibility* of ſinne in the indifferent things of *others* (eſpecially ſuch as are neerly related:) ſtirs up in the godly a feare, and a holy jealouſy of them, and rowſeth unto prayers for them: and therefore much more ſhould the *certaine*, and undoub ed aſſurance of the adheſion of ſinne unto our *own* indifferent actions provoke us, with contrite hearts to deprecate the wrath of God againſt us: All the indifferencies of unregenerate men are ſinnes: *Unto them that are defiled and unbelieving nothing is pure*, Tit. 1. 15. *the plowing of the wicked is ſinne*, Prov. 21. 4. And however *unto the pure all things are pure.* Tit. 1. 15. that is, all indifferent things in *themſelves* are lawfull, yet they may and doe *accidentally* become ſinne, when they are not in all particulars rightly circumſtanced: And then they preſent us with freſh occaſion for the renewall of our repentance and faith in Chriſt Jeſus: And how often this happeneth, is a matter, that the moſt wakefull and quickſighted conſcience can hardly diſcerne: ſo that the beſt of us may apply unto our indifferencies that of *David*, Pſalm. 19. 12. *Who can underſtand his errours: cleanſe thou me from ſecret faults.*

Secondly, The liableneſſe of our indifferent actions unto ſinne ſhould be a motive unto all poſſible *caution and warineſſe for the future* in them: There is no humane action ſo indifferent, but it is capable of ſinne, nay (if it be not in all particulars rightly circumſtantiated,) it becomes actually ſinfull; and therefore our hearts ſhould be very watchfull againſt ſinne in the uſe of all indifferencies, in our meales, in our feaſtings, and merry meetings, in our journey's, in our ordinary talke, and diſcourſe, in our walkes, in the actions of our ordinary vocations: *Indeed the rule of Gods word doth not at all either command, or forbid the matter of ſuch actions: but the manner of performing them commeth under the rule*: They are all to be done to the glory of God, in the name of Chriſt: every good creature is to be ſanctified by the word, and prayer: That Command, which God gave Abraham (*to walk before him*) is not to be ſtraitned unto the ordinances of God, but to be extended unto all deliberate acts of a mans life, and converſation, *Gen.* 17. 1. *Zechariah* (in his prophecy of the generall call or converſion of Jewes, and Gentiles) gives this for one character

character of ſuch, as ſhall be converted, that they ſhall have a ſacred and ſanctified uſe of things common and indifferent: *In that day ſhall there be upon the bells of their horſes, holineſſe unto the Lord, yea, every pot in Jeruſalem and Judah ſhall be holineſſe unto the Lord of Hoſts, Zech.* 14. 20, 21. Not onely acts of immediate worſhip, but all rationall actions, whatſoever, ſhould be offered up *as ſpirituall ſacrifices acceptable unto God by Jeſus Chriſt, 1 Pet.* 2. 5. The Apoſtle exhorts the Romans to *ſalute one another with an holy kiſſe, Rom.* 16. 16. this kiſſe was no religious rite in Gods worſhip, but a ceremony of civility; and therefore in it ſelfe a thing indifferent: And yet the Apoſtle requires holineſſe for the qualification of it: All our civill actions ought to be ſuch, as becommeth ſaints; that is, ſo farre forth holy for manner, that they be free from ſinne, and unto the glory of God: Indeed this is a ſtrictneſſe impoſſible unto lapſed man: But though we cannot *exactly and perfectly* obſerve it, yet we may *ſincerely and cordially* endeavour it: And this ſincere and hearty endeavour is that, which God, for Chriſt's ſake, will accept, reward, and crowne; and therefore it concernes us very much to uſe our utmoſt diligence herein: and the rather, becauſe we are (by farre) more prone and ready to ſlide into ſinne in things indifferent ere we are aware, then in ſuch things, as are for their nature, and matter ſinfull; for in ſuch things the danger is more apparent, and therefore the more feared, and watcht againſt; Whereas, if once we know, and are perſwaded, that actions are indifferent, and lawfull, then we are apt to think that all is ſafe, and that we need not trouble our ſelves with any farther conſiderations touching their expediency, and edification; and that there is no reaſon to perplex our hearts and conſciences with an anxious care of referring them to Gods glory, of walking before God in them, and of putting holyneſſe unto the Lord upon them. Now when once ſuch thoughts as theſe creepe into mens heads, it cannot be imagined, unto what exceſſes, and failings it expoſeth them: Adde unto this: that looke as the conſideration of the lawfulneſſe, and indifferency of actions occaſioneth a ſurprizall many times with hainous ſinnes: ſo alſo it proves (*by accident*) an obſtacle unto repentance for ſuch ſinnes: When the Godly fall into groſſe, and acknowledged ſinnes, either of omiſſion,

miſſion, or commiſſion; why, the checks of their own conſciences, the publick miniſtery, the reproaches of enemies, and the admonition of Chriſtian friends will ſoone awaken them, and informe them of their guilt: But as for the ſinnes, that adhere unto their indifferencies, how quickly are they hardened in them? For it is very ſeldome, that, either their conſciences, or their miniſters, or their Brethren take notice of them; or if they doe, they are apt preſently to hold forth the indifferencie, and lawfulneſſe of ſuch actions in themſelves, as a buckler to ward off all accuſations of Conſcience, all upbraidings of enemies, all reprehenſions, of either miniſters, or private friends: Thoſe, that are moſt laviſh of their time, and purſes, in gaming, will plead; that they follow none, but lawfull ſports: A Gentleman, that murders the greateſt part of his time in hunting, hawking, and the like exercises, and redeems but an inconſiderable portion of it to do God, and his Countrey ſervice, thinks, that he hath enough to ſtopp the mouth of all reproofe, to ſay, that the recreations, which he purſueth are things indifferent: ſuch riotous perſons, as waſt their pretious houres in joviallity, and goodfellowſhip, uſually make this Apology for themſelves: that it is not unlawfull to drinke with a friend in a Taverne or alehouſe. To awaken from this licentiouſneſſe, and to quicken in us a carefull watchfulneſſe over our hearts in the uſe of things indifferent, I ſhall, for concluſion of this diſcourſe, propound ſome examples of the ſeverity of Gods judgments againſt the ſinnes of mens indifferencies: *Davids* numbering of the people was a thing not evill *in it ſelfe*; but his curioſity, pride, and carnall confidence in an arme of fleſh made it ſo; And God was diſpleaſed with this thing, *therefore he ſmote Iſrael*, 1 Chron. 21.7. *with a peſtilence, that devoured* 70000. Doubtleſſe moſt of thoſe feminine ornaments (mentioned, *Eſay* 3.) were in themſelves lawfull; but the haughtineſſe, and wantonneſſe of the daughters of Zion abuſed them unto ſinne; And how ſeverely this ſinfull abuſe of them was threatned, you may read at large from *verſe the* 16 *uſque ad* 25: for Hezekiah to ſhew unto the Babylonian Ambaſſadours *the houſe of his pretious things, the ſilver, and the gold and the ſpices, and the pretious oyntment, and all the houſe of his armour, and all that was found in his treaſures*, all that was remarkable

kable in his houſe, and dominion was in it ſelfe, but a civill entertainment, and not unlawfull: but becauſe he did it out of vaine oſtentation, this turned it into ſinne, and this was one of the ſins, which God chaſtiſed with the captivity of the whole nation, *Eſay* 39 2 *Chron.* 32. 2 *Kings* 30. *To be cloathed in Purple, and fine linnen, and to fare ſumptuouſly* were things in themſelves indifferent; but the exceſſe of the rich glutton made it ſinfull unto him: and this ſinne, not being repented of, was unto him a forerunner of hell torments, *Luke* 16. 19, 23. They were the ſinnes of things indifferent that had a great hand in, and influence upon the drowning of the old world, and the burning of Sodome, *Luke* 17. *verſ.* 27, 28, 29. *In the daies of* Noah, *they did eat, they dranke, they married wives, they were given in marriage, untill the day that* Noah *entred into the arke; and the flood came and deſtroyed them all. Likewiſe alſo as it was in the daies of Lot, they did eat, they dranke, they bought, they ſold, they planted, they builded: But the ſame day that Lot went out of Sodome, it rained fire and brimſtone from Heaven, and deſtroyed them all.*

FINIS.